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The argument in this thesis is that the Mexican military stands as a hindrance in 
Mexico’s consolidation of democracy because of the lack of executive and legislative 
controls over the armed forces, and military prerogatives. The loss of power by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) left a void of control overt the military and no 
other legal mechanisms exist to control the military. The military’s prerogatives include a 
unique relationship to the chief executive, active-duty military participation in the 
cabinet, a role in intelligence and police functions and others. These prerogatives make 
them autonomous, intrusive in society, and are turning the country into a militarized 
zone, and when coupled with the lack of controls over the military, equates to a volatile 
mixture needing only a spark to set off an explosion of military contestation of authority. 
A threat to their prerogatives by politicians or the president could in the future be the 
spark that ignites that dangerous mixture into a contestation of authority that hinders the 
democratic process.  
Finally, the problems with insurgency, drugs, and crimes have caused the 
government to leave the affairs of internal security to the military, giving them more 
prerogatives. As a result, the military has expanded its presence throughout Mexico and 
fulfills many functions in society, and when coupled with a lack of executive and 
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After the beginning of the third wave of democratization in 1974, more than 80 
countries have transitioned to democracy. With its first nationwide democratic elections 
in July 2000, and President Vicente Fox’s assumption of his duties in December, Mexico 
became the most recent country in Latin America to transition to democracy. Because 
Mexico currently has the necessary state institutions in place and is achieving economic 
prosperity for a successful transition, it now needs to consolidate its democracy. 
However, the establishment of civilian control of the military apparatus along democratic 
lines is the neurological point of democratic consolidation,1 and clearly, that is not the 
case in Mexico. 
With the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) loss of power after ruling 
Mexican politics for 71 years, remained a void of control over the military since it used to 
fill the gap left open from the lack of executive and legislative controls. The lack of these 
types of controls and the level of prerogatives enjoyed by the military create a volatile 
mixture that could explode into the contestation of authority if left unchecked.  
Before 1946 when Miguel Aleman became the first civilian president, military 
leaders ruled Mexico, and the subsequent relationship with the PRI did not require 
additional controls over the military. The lines of authority from the president to the 
military today does not have a buffer of trained civilian authorities that can exercise 
control over the military, like those found in consolidated democracies. In fact, four 
active duty generals serve on the president’s cabinet such as the secretary of national 
defense, the attorney general, secretary of the Navy, and the chairman of the joint chiefs. 
In theory, the Mexican legislature has certain token constitutional controls but has never 
exercised investigative, oversight, and accountability measures over the military, all 
needed for effective civilian democratic controls.  
The level of military prerogatives exacerbates the issue with the lack of executive 
and legislative controls. For example, the military “assumes they have an acquired right 
or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, 
                                                 
1 Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy and the market.” Cambridge University Press, Pg. 29. 
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to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even structure 
relationships between the state and political or civil society.”2 The Mexican military is 
very autonomous and fulfils many functions in society, as seen by the prerogatives listed 
below. 
An autonomous military is one with a high number of prerogatives which allows 
them to manipulate the civilian leadership, influence public policies, and can distance 
itself from other institutions at will. Also, with increased internal missions in society, the 
prerogatives have allowed the military to increase their presence throughout the 
countryside by increasing their jurisdictions from 10 to 12 military regions. Furthermore, 
as security problems become more complex because of increased insurgency and terrorist 
movements, as well as illegal drug activity, the military will continue militarizing the 
Mexican countryside.  
A review of the literature reveals that social and political scientists and other 
experts have grossly understudied the Mexican military. The bottom line seems to be that 
observers of democratic transitions lack the academic interest in studying the Mexican 
military because of the absence of dramatic military coups and the contesting of 
authority. However, they are mistaken. Dictatorships, military regimes, and violent power 
struggles from 1821 to 1860, gave way to at least 50 different presidencies.3 Power 
struggles between repressive Caudillos such as Santa Anna and others, as well as bad 
economic conditions, further brought about civil war between 1910 and the 1920s. The 
end of the civil war gave rise to the government of General Plutarco Diaz, and a short 
time later, the National Revolutionary Party (the antecedent of the PRI) was born in 
1929.4 While the PRI-military pact that emerged further put an end to armed strife in 
Mexico, it marked the beginning of the PRI-military relationship.5 However, it wasn’t 
until 1946 that a group of army generals offered the presidency to Miguel Aleman, 
                                                 
2 Ibid. Pg. 93. 
3 Skidmore, Thomas E., and Smith, Peter H. “Modern Latin America.” Oxford University Press (2001). Pg. 
220. 
4 Correspondence and interview via the internet with Jorge-Luis Sierra, security specialist on Mexico in 
Mexico City. jlsierra@hotmail.com. Date: November 14, 2001. 
5 Schedler, Andreas. “Mexico’s Victory, The Democratic Revelation,” Pg. 6.  Journal of Democracy, 
Volume 11, Number 4. Oct. 2000. 
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becoming the first civilian president, but only accepted under the condition that he would 
grant absolute cooperation and respect for the military institution.6 This review of 
Mexican history reveals the fact that the military does have a dangerous legacy of 
contestation of authority, which might explain why President Fox is attempting to win the 
military’s loyalty by appointing generals to cabinet positions. This practice, as well as the 
prerogatives enjoyed by the Mexican military, runs counter the democratic process. 
Mexico’s transition to democracy has left a void of control over the military after 
toppling the PRI regime, especially since there are no executive and legislative controls 
in place. As a result, the military’s autonomy, its prerogatives, and their internal missions 
is a volatile mixture just waiting for a spark to set off an explosion of contestation of 
authority. However, a threat to the military’s prerogatives could set off that explosion, 
while its legacy of contesting authority shows it will respond when threatened or 
challenged. For these reasons, the Mexican military stands as a hindrance to Mexico’s 








































I. INTRODUCTION  
It has been argued that democratization in the world has occurred in waves in 
history’s recent past. The momentous reason behind the drive towards democratization is 
the believe that “democracies rarely wage war on one another.”7 Others argue that the 
“quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a worldwide 
movement toward political democracy and economic rationality.”8 One wave began right 
after World War II when the United States forced Japan to democratize.9 While many 
years later, the third wave of democratization began with the over-throw of the 
Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974,10 and since then, more than 80 countries have 
transitioned to democracy.11  
In the Western Hemisphere, it was only recently that Mexico made political 
history when it evolved into a new democracy in July 2000. The election of President 
Vicente Fox brought about the downfall of Mexico’s civilian authoritarian government, 
which ruled Mexican politics for 71 years under the direction of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). However, despite the successful transition, Mexico still has to 
grapple with the consolidation of its democracy.   
Many democratic transitions in Latin America are still struggling to consolidate 
their gains because their main problems stem from their failure to establish civilian 
control over their armed forces following military dictatorships. In contrast, many 
erroneously assume that because Mexico had a civilian authoritarian regime and a non-
threatening military, that its consolidation phase will not be affected by the military. 
Contrary to this belief, this thesis will argue that several critical issues surrounding the 
                                                 
7 Gowa, Joanne. “Bullets and Ballots.” Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Pg. 3. 
8 Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy and the Market.” Cambridge University Press (1991). Preface page. 
9 Center for Civil-Military Relations web site. Naval Postgraduate School, www.ccmr.org. Week 4, 
Regimes and Democratization. 
10 Diamond, Larry. “Developing Democracy. Towards Consolidation.” The Johns Hopkins University 
Press (1999). Pg. 24. 
11 Center for Civil-Military Relations web site. Naval Postgraduate School, www.ccmr.org. Week 4, 
Regimes and Democratization. 
1 
Mexican military today cause it to stand as an obstacle in Mexico’s consolidation of 
democracy. 
The argument that the military stands as a hindrance to Mexico’s consolidation of 
democracy brings to light certain assumptions that merit a closer analysis. To support this 
claim, this author reviews many Mexican primary and secondary sources for relevant 
data. The literature on democratic transitions in other countries, and the influence exerted 
in that process by their militaries, provides the intellectual bridge with which to cross 
over and analyze the raw data emerging from Mexico’s democratization.  
Therefore, applying the general lessons learned about democratization in other 
countries to Mexico’s attempt at consolidation, the following assumptions are addressed 
to support the main argument of this thesis.  
• The fall of the PRI from power left a void of control over the military 
• Mexico lacks democratic controls over the military and the intelligence 
service 
• Based on the military’s prerogatives, the military has a high level of 
autonomy and therefore, poses a threat to Mexico’s democracy  
• An absence of a legacy of coups and contestation of civilian authority does 
not equate to a docile military 
• Mexico is becoming a militarized zone measured by the armed force’s 
presence throughout the country, and the military’s role in society  
• Mexico’s three main problems stemming from insurgency, crime, and 
drugs, will further cause the increase of the armed force’s role in society 
By addressing these assumptions, evidence will prove that the Mexican military does 
matter in the transition process, and in fact, stands as a hindrance in Mexico’s 
consolidation of democracy. 
In his discussion of democracy as an equilibrium, Adam Przeworski refers to the 
militaries in regime transitions as being “the neurological point of democratic 
consolidation.”12 Furthermore, political scientists like Linz, Stepan and Aguero argue that 
controlling the military apparatus is tantamount to the consolidation of any democracy 
because of its role in the legitimate use of force in society. 
                                                 
12 Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy and the market.” Cambridge University Press, Pg. 29. 
2 
Many would argue that the Mexican military does not pose a threat in Mexico or 
to the peace and stability of the region, and as a result, it has been understudied. It is 
precisely due to this lack of understanding of the Mexican military that has caused 
researchers to miss the point of why the PRI successfully ruled Mexican politics for 71 
years. While Mexico’s political regime, economics, and other elements have been studied 
to some degree, it has only occurred superficially compared to those of other Latin 
American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This academic neglect by U.S. 
scholars may also be due to a common argument that Mexico’s civil-military system has 
been very stable and non-violent and therefore, does not merit a closer analysis. In fact, a 
cursory review of the literature reveals that social and political scientists and other 
experts have grossly understudied the Mexican military. The bottom line seems to be that 
observers of democratic transitions lack the academic interest in studying the Mexican 
military because of the absence of dramatic military coups and the contesting of 
authority.  
In the next chapter, I establish a theoretical framework to support the main 
argument. First, the four-step process of democratization argued by Political Scientist 
George Sorensen is briefly explained, followed by a discussion of where Mexico stands 
today in the process of democratization. Second, special emphasis is given to the levels of 
military contestation and prerogatives as argued by Stepan, and institutionalization of the 
military regime and its prerogatives as discussed by Aguero. This step is central to this 
chapter because it sets the foundation of why the military apparatus does matter in 
Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. The third step will include a discussion of controls 
and oversights exercised over the military’s roles and missions in America’s democracy, 
as well as those controls exercised by ministries of defense. Chapter III will discuss the 
non-democratic practices still being exercised in Mexico, despite its recent transition. The 
premise is that even though a transition did occur, nothing else has changed in the control 
of the military and its prerogatives, and therefore, poses a threat to Mexico’s 
consolidation of democracy. In Chapter IV, I will analyze the roles and missions of the 
Mexican military in internal security, and the militarization of the country by the 
expansion their areas of operations and jurisdiction. In Chapter V, there will be an 
analysis of the emerging problems since Mexico’s transition to democracy. Finally, in 
3 
Chapter VI, there will be a conclusion of the analysis of Mexico’s consolidation efforts, 
and it will include a set of recommendations. 
4 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN: DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITIONS, AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
A.  WHAT IS DEMOCRACY ALL ABOUT? 
Democracy is not simply characterized by free and fair elections. Even people in 
the U.S. Department of State who analyze other countries as part of their job have 
erroneously concluded that Mexico became fully democratized once they achieved “free 
and fair elections.”13 However, democratization is certainly allot more than that. What is 
democracy?  
Because of the many critical issues countries have to resolve before they can be 
considered democratic, the definition of democracy is somewhat elusive. In fact, political 
scientists disagree on the details of the definition and how it is measured.14 In his book 
“Patterns of Democracy,” Political Scientist Arend Lijphart promotes Robert Dahl’s 
definition of democracy as still commanding wide support, and containing the following 
eight criteria:  
• The right to vote 
• The right to be elected 
• The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes 
• Elections that are free and fair 
• Freedom of association 
• Freedom of expression 
• Alternative sources of information, and 
• Institutions for making public policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference.  
Other theories discussed in this chapter, coupled with evidence from Mexico’s transition 
in subsequent chapters, will prove that Mexico’s success at consolidation dependents on 
other issues that go beyond those provided in this or any other definition.  
                                                 
13 This argument is the general consensus between the Deputy Director of Mexican Affairs and his staff at 
the U.S. Department of State. This author conducted an interview with these officials on September 26, 
2001. 
14 Lijphart, Arend, “Patterns of Democracy.” Yale University Press, 1999. Pg. 48. 
5 
In studying transitions to democracy, George Sorensen characterized it as being a 
four-step process, and illustrated below.15 The democratization process normally begins 
with the people uniting as a nation and proceeding to the preparatory phase, where certain 
actions take place that will provide the opportunity for change. A change in this step is 
the breakdown of the non-democratic regime. The decision phase, which just occurred in 
Mexico with the exercise of free and fair elections, is where democratic order begins. The 
final phase is the consolidation of democracy.   
 
Figure 1.   Sorensen’s Democratization Processes  
It is precisely in the last stage that Mexico finds itself in this process—struggling 
to consolidate its democracy. The main thrust of this thesis is an examination of this 
process as it relates to civil-military relations. Doctor Larry Diamond with the Hoover 
Institution suggests that consolidation of fragile democracies requires three generic tasks 
including democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.16 
However, much like a physician would triage mass casualties to treat the most serious 
patients first, Mexico will have to identifying and address those factors that actually 
hinder its transition to democracy, before they pursue anything else.  
Since Mexico already has in place many of the important institutions necessary to 
consolidate its democracy, deepening of democracy is its most important generic task. 
Diamond further suggests that democratic deepening makes the formal structures of 
democracy more liberal, accountable, representative, and accessible, essentially 
democratic.17 Within this important task is found the issue of civil-military relations, an 
important element of democracy. This need for controlling the military and its 
                                                 
15 Sorensen, George “Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World.” 
Westview Press, 1998.  
16 Diamond, Larry. “Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation.” The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999. Pg. 74.  
17 Ibid. 
6 
intelligence branch can be summed up in the following two observations. “The greatest 
‘sin’ intelligence organizations can commit in a democracy, is that of turning the 
intelligence tools against the very people they want to protect.”18 Furthermore, the 
greatest ‘sin’ military institutions can commit in a democracy, is that of turning the tools 
of war against the very people they want to protect.  
A central idea of democracy evolves around two major issues, civilian control of 
the military in domestic affairs and of the intelligence service. According to Diamond, 
when a military leadership is involved in the political process and fulfills other internal 
roles, it erodes the military’s distinct role as a defender of the country and the people.19 
Therefore, democratic consolidation normally requires a strategy that reduces the 
influence of the military in non-military issues and functions, and civilian control and 
oversight is established over broad military and national security policies.20  
B.  THE MILITARY IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 
Having made the point that control of the military is key to the consolidation of 
democracy, the following discussion examines factors present in civil-military relations 
in the pre and post transition period. Special emphasis is given to the levels of military 
contestation and prerogatives as argued by Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, and 
institutionalization of the military regime and its prerogatives as discussed by Felipe 
Aguero. Although both authors write about the transition from military authoritarian 
regimes, their theories and practical applications in understanding the influence of 
militaries still apply to Mexico’s transition. Furthermore, sample cases will be discussed 
to effectively argue that the combination of low contestation and high military 
prerogatives as they exist in Mexico is a dangerous mixture. Also, because the 
prerogatives in the countries discussed pose a danger to their own democracies, we can 
conclude that the same type of danger exists in Mexico because it shares similar 
prerogatives to the other troubled nations.  
                                                 
18 Johnson, Loch. “America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society.”  Oxford, 1989. Ch. 4, 
“Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence.” Pg 73. 
19 Ibid. Pg. 114. 
20 Diamond, Larry. “Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation.” The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999. Pg. 114.  
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In “Rethinking Military Politics,” Stepan contributes to the analysis of military 
authoritarian regimes and their power to influence civil-military relations outcomes. In 
setting the stage for his discussion, he relies on the classic sociology of Max Weber when 
he said that “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” is part of the definition 
of the modern state.21 Focusing on this issue, Stepan further clarifies the requirement for 
the control of such a monopoly. “For polities that aspire to be democracies, a complex 
range of norms, institutions and practices must be constructed socially, constantly 
reconstructed, and continually brought to bear so that a democratic polity in fact shapes, 
monitors, and controls the means of force that are an intrinsic part of both its ‘stateness’ 
and its democracy.”22  
1.  Contestation and Prerogatives 
Applying Stepan’s theory of the relationship between the level of contestation and 
prerogatives to any military apparatus helps determine the level of autonomy enjoyed by 
that force. Also, because with this theory one can identify the actual prerogatives held by 
a military force, it provides a basis by which to develop a policy prescription to tip the 
balance of power to civilian rule. There are several factors necessary in establishing 
democratic controls over the military, but three are particularly more relevant than the 
others.23 The first deals with “the dimension of the articulated military contestation 
against the policies of the newly elected democratic leadership.”24 The second is the 
dimension of military institutional prerogatives. Central to these two dimensions is the 
military’s on-going fear of being held accountable for human rights violations once the 
transition to democracy occurs. The third dimension deals with the issue of transparency 
and accountability for the defense budget, from appropriations to its actual expenditure 
and accountability. 
The first dimension of military contestation against civilian authority usually 
occurs when the new civilian leadership threatens the military apparatus in some way or 
another. Deposed military leaders normally try to secure an amnesty for themselves and 
                                                 
21 Stepan, Alfred. “Rethinking Military Politics.” Princeton University Press 1998. Pg. Ix. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. Pg. 68. 
24 Ibid.  
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their followers once the new regime takes over, and when threatened with prosecution, 
they challenge the state. Examples of contestation in other countries have occurred 
because of the new government’s desire to restructure the military’s mission (from 
internal to externally focused), or to establish strong control mechanisms.  
Stepan uses eleven prerogatives used to determine how much a military has at 
stake upon exiting from governing, while serving as a tool to determine how autonomous 
they are. Using his terms, “prerogatives are a prior, exclusive, or peculiar right of 
privilege, and, as a faculty or property by which a being is especially and advantageously 
distinguished above others.”25 In this area, the military as an institution “assumes they 
have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over 
its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state 
apparatus, or even structure relationships between the state and political or civil 
society.”26 Listed in the table below are Stepan’s eleven prerogatives.  
Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the 
military in the political system 
Role in intelligence 
Military relationship to the chief executive Role in police 
Coordination of defense sector Role in military promotions 
Active-duty military participation in the cabinet Role in state enterprises 
Role in the legislature Role in legal system 
Role of senior career civil servants or civilian 
political appointees 
 
Figure 2.   Stepan’s Eleven Prerogatives.  
An autonomous military is one with a high number of prerogatives, which allows 
them to manipulate the civilian leadership, influences public policies, and can distance 
itself from other institutions at will. Militaries that are allowed to exercise any number of 
these prerogatives are essentially a danger to democracy because they can easily 
undermine civilian authority without fear of repercussion because of their autonomy.  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. Pg. 93. 
26 Ibid. Pg. 93. 
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2.  The Relationship of Contestation and Prerogatives 
To complete an analysis of military influence in transitions, one has to look at the 
relationship between two variables already discussed, contestation and prerogatives.27 
Although there are four possible arrangements, only two will be discussed here, since the 
other two are highly unlikely for Mexico in this author’s estimation.  
Obviously, the goal of a democracy is to execute a strategy that will yield low 
contestation and low prerogatives, which Stepan equates to civilian control.28 In contrast, 
an unequal civilian accommodation is a military that has low contestation and high 
prerogatives. Argued in this thesis is that the unequal civilian accommodation 
arrangement applies to Mexico’s military apparatus after its transition to democracy. The 
low contestation by the Mexican military has for years been erroneously identified as a 
docile regime because the primary argument made has been that Mexico has not had any 
military coups since the civil war (1911-1920). Before the civil war, however, the 
military in Mexico had a vibrant legacy of contestation and prerogatives.  
In the current arrangement, the absence of contestation of civilian authority does 
not equate to a peaceful military. The fact that the military has not contested civilian rule 
does not indicate a peaceful future because it may be possible that civilians have been 
afraid to recommend policies that threaten the military. This issue is particularly critical 
for Mexico because its politicians are just now learning to debate the government’s 
position, and to challenge the Executive Branch. If, in the future, a bold president or 
member of congress does try to reduce the military’s prerogatives, there could be a high 
degree of contestation, and depending on the balance of power, it could lead to a 
breakdown of democracy.29 The balance of power favors the military if we consider the 
militarization of Mexico, the military’s role in domestic society including intelligence 
collection on civilians, and the lack of democratic controls over the military. In fact, if a 
problem with the Mexican military were to arise, an action-reaction chain of events will 
cause political-military friction.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. Pg. 100-107. 
28 Ibid. Pg. 100. 
29 Ibid. Pg. 102. 
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3.  Prerogatives and Institutionalization 
In analyzing the influence exerted by a military in the post transition, Felipe 
Aguero provides a somewhat different view than Stepan, but the desired result, civilian 
control, is the same. Where Stepan focuses on a military’s level of autonomy, Aguero’s 
analysis of military institutionalization in connection with prerogatives, identifies the 
“how” of success in gaining immunity or maintaining prerogatives in the post transition.  
There have been several attempts to develop explanations for how outgoing 
military regimes have affected the democratic transitions in Latin American countries. 
Felipe Aguero agrees with Lowenthal and Dominguez in their work on post authoritarian 
regimes in that traditional explanations for the path of democratic transitions in these 
countries are incomplete.30 In analyzing these paths, most authors have related them to 
the presence of problems of participation and representation, accountability, rule of law, 
economic constraints and inequality, and civilian controls.31 Not satisfied with these 
explanations, Aguero focuses on the impact of military prerogatives established during 
the pre-transition as affecting the quality of the emerging democracy.32  
Attempts at explaining the path of new arrangements in other parts of the world as 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, have allowed researchers to identify the 
six explanations listed below.33 
• The manner of the transition. 
• The nature of the regime right before the transition. 
• Resurgence of old [beliefs or practices as] schizophrenia 
and causes new problems, and therefore influences the new 
path. 
• Post-transition arrangements. 
• The ability of new institutions to erode old legacies 
• Others simply reject all explanations 
However, Aguero claims that all the explanations are inconclusive and supports it with a 
statement by Adam Preworski: “where one is going matters as much as where one is 
                                                 
30 Editors, Hollifiesld, James F., and Jillson, Calvin. Rutledge (2000). “Pathways to Democracy.” Chapter 
4, “Transition Pathways: Institutional Legacies, the Military, and Democracy in South America" by 
Aguero, Felipe. Pg. 74. 
31 Ibid. Pg. 73. 
32 Ibid. Pg. 74. 
33 Ibid. Pg. 76. 
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coming from.”34 It is from this basis that Aguero takes the stand that the impact of the 
South American military prerogatives in civil-military relations shape the relationships of 
their own democracy.35 
Like Stepan, Aguero also defines prerogatives in his argument. Military 
prerogatives are essentially the privileges (autonomy, political influence, and other 
powers) enjoyed by the military apparatus over civilian leaders in the civil-military 
relations of a country. In his investigation of the impact of military prerogatives, Aguero 
analyses the pre and post civil-military relations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and 
Uruguay.  
4.  Limiting Prerogatives 
Similar to Stepan’s argument that control of the military is tantamount to 
democracy, Aguero argues that although political competition and other factors are 
important, limits on military prerogatives are requisite for effective democratic 
governance.36 It is particularly true in post-authoritarian regimes, that even when 
necessary institutions display the regular practice of competitive elections, a high level of 
military prerogatives will severely curtail the democratic nature of the new regime.37 
According to Aguero, transition modes are decisive in shaping the current state of 
military prerogatives and constraints on democracy. Also, the military’s ability to sustain 
their old prerogatives in the new democracy, are strongly influenced by the legal 
institutional factors present in the previous arrangement. In other words, the military feels 
that their long-held prerogatives are legitimized by the rules and/or norms of the previous 
arrangement, especially if the balance of power during the transition favors them.38  
5.  Institutionalization 
The extent to which the military can maintain its coherence and 
institutionalization during the pre transition phase determines how much freedom and 
how effective it will be at securing immunity from being held accountable for previous 
                                                 
34 Ibid. Pg. 77. 
35 Ibid. Pg. 77. 
36 Ibid. Pg. 74. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. Pg. 78. 
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crimes in the new democracy. In the case of Mexico, the military has clearly been 
implicated to atrocities, as in their response during a student demonstration in Mexico 
City in 1968 where hundreds of unarmed students were killed. Furthermore, during the 
PRI’s struggle to maintain their power in the last two decades, a sort of a “dirty war” 
occurred in which hundreds disappeared at the hands of the military-backed intelligence 
system. In this and other examples, no official has ever been brought to justice. In fact, 
even after Mexico’s new president took over in December 2000, cases of human rights 
violations continue to be reported.  
Aguero has defined institutionalization as “the establishment of formal rules that 
regulate the power structure within the regime and the assignment of government 
functions to non-representative or semi-representative bodies, including the armed 
forces.”39 In Aguero’s research, institutionalization led to two types of consequences. 
First, the stabilization of the military leadership lead to predictable rules of relationships 
in intra-military and military to government, which further separated the military and the 
government itself. The stability from the separation from the government and military 
leadership, which kept the militaries from being challenged, strengthened the military’s 
position during their transition in those countries studied. In Mexico’s case, there was 
separation in the pre transition, and today, the military still enjoys influence with the 
president.  
A further important distinction in transition modes is the degree of strength in 
which the military enters the transition. This strength determines whether the military can 
proceed without having to compromise, impose its own terms, or if they must reach out 
to the opposition to compromise on the execution of the transition.40 In Peru in 1980, the 
military exited with few explicit guarantees for itself, which gave it autonomy in specific 
circumstances and with the expectation that military matters would be dealt with 
carefully and in consensus with its leadership.41 In Mexico’s case, however, they have 
                                                 
39 Ibid. Pg. 77. 
40 Ibid. Pg. 78. 
41 Ibid. Pg. 79. 
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always been very autonomous. Today, Peru has the capacity to obstruct justice in the new 
democracy in the following ways:42  
• Peru’s military retained autonomy in handling its affairs 
and prerogatives in internal security issues (in its 1983 
transition) 
• Increased their budgets and the new regime handed over 
the handling of the upsurge of two insurgent groups 
(Shining Path and Tupac Amaru) because the government 
proved to be incompetent against them 
• Experienced little or no civilian oversight, increased human 
rights violations and open contestation against civilian 
authority 
• Refuted government attempts to create controls and 
oversight of the military 
• Since problems with insurgency increased, the military 
took control of 2/3 of the territory under a state of 
emergency plan 
• It became more autonomous, their internal roles increased, 
and human rights violations continued to surge 
• President Fugimori brought about an expansion of the 
military’s legal prerogatives with support from Congress, 
further suppressing society 
In other similar sample countries, their prerogatives, like those existing in 
Mexico, are also a volatile mixture in their new democracies. In Chile, the military has 
budgetary autonomy.43 In Brazil, cabinet-level positions were given to nine active duty 
officers.44 In Uruguay, the new minister of defense, formerly president and army general, 
made sure military officers did not have to show up to court when summoned on issues of 
human rights violations.45   
  6.  The Three Arenas as a Strategy  
Promoted as a strategy, Stepan provides a policy prescription to address the 
control of the military in the relationship between three interactive, yet conceptually 
distinct arenas of the polity: civil society, political society, and the state.46 In civil society, 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. Pg. 85. 
45 Ibid. Pg. 87. 
46 Stepan, Alfred. “Rethinking Military Politics.” Princeton University Press 1998. Pg. 12. 
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“democracy is about the open contestation for power via elections, and the oversight and 
control of state power by the representatives of the people.”47  
Like the overall democratic strategy by which civilians can gain or regain 
democratic controls, the legislature should develop a strategy to empower themselves, as 
would be found in the political society. In most advanced democracies, mechanisms have 
been crafted over time to perform routine oversight and monitoring of the military and 
intelligence services, such as standing committees in the legislatures or cabinet 
positions.48 This strategy should include the ability to bring military or intelligence 
officials to the legislature to defend budgets or to explain their needs, to discuss strategies 
for national defense, or explain past actions. Those countries with weak legislatures that 
only have the power to call for a special commission of inquiry as a form of 
accountability, has two fundamental problems according to Stepan.49 First, because they 
are ad hoc inquiries, legislators do not have a trained cadre of civilians, with expert 
knowledge of the intricacies of that field, who could assist in identifying causes or 
problems.50 Second, because they are ad hoc, the summoned speaker is usually on the 
defensive.51 
Because the military has a technical monopoly concerning military expertise in 
non-democratic countries per se, “the capacity of the democratic government to exercise 
a monopoly over the management of the force within the state apparatus is extremely 
limited.” For that matter, the state should have people and institutions in civil and 
political society with a comprehensive understanding and concern about national defense 
and military affairs. Using civilian experts, the president will have the ideological, 
technical, and organizational resources he needs to effectively manage the military 
apparatus. 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid. Pg. 128. 
48 Ibid. Pg. 133. 
49 Ibid. Pg. 134. 
50 Ibid. Pg. 134. 
51 Ibid. Pg. 134. 
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C. DEMOCRATIC MODELS IN CONTROLLING THE MILITARY’S 
ROLES AND MISSIONS  
Often after transitioning to democratic ideals, countries have to face the reality of 
what to do with the state’s military apparatus. One question they must address is whether 
they should refocus from internal defense to an external one. Central to this debate in any 
new democracy is the struggle to balance the internal security needs of the state with the 
principles of liberty. Mature democratic countries such as the United States and Great 
Britain, although conscious of varying types of domestic problems, focus their military 
posture on external threats. Except for section 2 below, the other sections are examples of 
‘democratic’ restraints over the military. 
1.  External Defense  
Focusing the military on external defense serves several purposes: first, it protects 
the country from external enemies, and second, it allows civilian police organizations to 
carry out their domestic roles. The beginning of the Cold War so soon after World War II 
caused the U.S. to maintain a sizeable military force capable of protecting herself, as well 
as friends and allies. Adopting an external military threat posture can keep the military 
operationally ready and capable of responding to a foreign threat at any time.  
Maintaining the military’s focus on an external threat also allows domestic 
civilian police organizations to fulfill their roles within society and further legitimize 
their existence. When civilian organizations are allowed to operate without military 
interference, it legitimizes their existence in the eyes of the public and helps garner 
support. The simple idea that the military in democracies do not get involved in domestic 
affairs except under specific criteria, sends the message that civilian police organizations 
are capable of accomplishing their role in society. However, when the military is focused 
internally, problems often occur. 
2.  The Problems with Internal Defense Missions 
The fundamental problem in focusing the military’s role on domestic issues is that 
the state’s legitimate use of force and its tools of war are used against the very people 
they want to protect. As a result, employing military power against civilians generally 
leads to human right abuses because by their very nature they are trained to kill, and not 
trained in arrest powers and human sensitivities. Human rights violations strike at the 
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very heart of democracy because it goes counter to democracy’s implied goal of 
protecting its citizens from unrestrained and autonomous state institutions. While most 
Latin American countries focused their military internally, the reasons why they do that 
differ slightly. For example, military regimes that take control of a state through a coup 
are themselves worried they will be toppled by someone else’s coup, and therefore, 
repress society to stay in power. Conversely, civilian authoritarian regimes permit 
unrestricted military involvement in domestic affairs to control the masses and to use 
military support against political opponents in order to stay in power. In both cases, 
however, unrestrained military action has lead to unnecessary use of  force, excessive 
force, and deadly force, often because soldiers are not trained in the rule of law and 
human sensitivities.  
3. Limited Domestic Involvement in Disasters and Recovery & 
Assistance 
Democratic countries like the U.S. do involve the military in domestic affairs such 
as in natural disasters, response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and some 
humanitarian missions. What is different between non-democratic countries and the U.S. 
model with domestic functions is that the latter performs these tasks under certain 
mandates. For example, laws and regulations authorize the military to become engaged in 
certain domestic affairs while placing limits on their involvement. In the U.S., every state 
National Guard has a dedicated Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) unit 
that responds to natural and man-made disasters within their respective states.  
As an example, the MSCA unit of the Texas National Guard has, through the 
years, increased its support to the state’s Division of Emergency Management (DEM). As 
listed below, their support is regulated by laws that authorize and control involvement, as 
well as protect the military’s involvement in domestic affairs. 
• Texas Disaster Act, Texas Government Code, Chapter 418 
• The Executive Order of the Governor relating to 
Emergency Management  
• Texas Administrative Code Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 7 
• National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-1/ANG 10-8101 
• Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act 
• Public Law 93-288 (protection for soldiers on state active 
duty) 
17 
 When the military are asked to support civilians in natural or man-made disasters, 
they are always subordinate to the civilian agencies that are in charge of the operations. A 
civilian leader at DEM decides where they need emergency assets, and it is then up to the 
National Guard to allocate appropriate assets. For example, the Texas MSCA coordinates 
National Guard aviation assets to provide helicopter support for dropping treated water 
on forest fires. When needed, in the Fall and Spring, the MSCA coordinates with other 
units to assist state and city personnel in responding to dangerous floods, and to help with 
icy roads in the Winter. At other times, the Texas Guard assists authorities during 
hurricanes and tornadoes.52 
4. Limited Involvement in Counter Drug Operations (internal & 
external) 
Both active duty forces and the National Guard play a supervised role in domestic 
counter drug operations in the United States. Active duty forces that work within the U.S. 
are assigned to Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), while most states have counter drug 
programs coordinated through the National Guard. For example, the Texas Counter Drug 
Support Program assists local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in their fight 
against drugs in a “supporting” role with very strict mandates. A distinguishing factor 
between American’s democracy in the war on drugs compared to non-democracies, is 
that the support role they provide is backed by legal restrictions. Contrary to the U.S. 
model, in Mexico’s case, the military conducts its own independent operations, but when 
joint operations are conducted with civilian authorities, the military plans, coordinates, 
and is in charge of those operations.  
Laws approved by the U.S. Congress dictate that the National Guard may provide 
“support” to law enforcement in counter drug operations under strict guidelines. A 
support role means that soldiers do not have arrest powers, cannot seize drugs, do not 
work under-cover, are not in the chain of custody of evidence, and only a few members 
can carry weapons. As an example of these constraints, the following laws and 
regulations authorize the National Guard to support law enforcement in counter drug 
operations, as well as providing limits to their involvement. 
                                                 
52 For emergencies requiring additional assets at once, elements of active duty units have been called by 
DEM to assist. In one example, the director of DEM negotiated for additional helicopter support from Fort 
Hood to help with fires in Texas in the Summer of 2000 
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• 32 USC Sec. 112. Drug interdiction and counter-drug 
activities 
• § 431.046. Property Forfeiture (Added by Acts 1997, 75th 
Leg., ch. 813, § 1, eff. June 17, 1997.)  
During counter drug operations, the military is never the lead agency, and where possible, 
a law enforcement representative is present during these operations. 
Overall, the Texas National Guard supports law enforcement agencies in 
countering both the supply of drugs and its demand. In countering the supply side of 
drugs into the U.S., the National Guard assigns soldiers and airmen to the U.S. Customs 
at the ports of entry, and at various field offices of the FBI, DEA, and IRS. On the 
demand side, the National Guard hosts drug awareness programs to teach young people 
about the dangers of drug abuse, and soldiers are active as role models and mentors. 
D. DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS: EXECUTIVE AND STATE MEASURES  
While the previous section dealt with the control of the U.S. military in certain 
domestic roles through laws and regulations, this section deals with more broad measures 
of democratic control. In democracies, whether presidential or parliamentary 
democracies, one finds various mechanisms of control echelons above the operational 
level not normally seen by the average soldier, but nevertheless, democratic in nature. 
Although both types of democracies are generally distinct in its base structure, they both 
share the same goal of controlling the military along democratic means. Discussed first in 
this section is the U.S. model of presidential democracy, followed by a brief discussion of 
the parliamentary model in controlling the military apparatus through the ministry of 
defense.  
1. Layers of Control in the Presidential Model 
In the U.S., the president is the commander and chief of the armed forces per 
Article II, Section 2 [1] of the United States Constitution. Stated in this Article, is that 
“the president shall be the commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the 
United States…” In order to effectively fulfill his role, the president appoints multiple 
layers of civilian executives to control and oversee the military. To help manage the 
military apparatus on a day-today basis, the president appoints:  
• Secretary of Defense 
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• Civilian secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force 
The civilian control and oversight measures exercised by the Executive and 
Legislative Branch of the United States are particularly noteworthy compared to other 
democracies because of the number of ‘civilian’ layers of controls. The more layers of 
civilian control and oversight with overlapping or seamless powers results in tighter 
democratic controls. To help the reader understand the concept of multiple layers of 
controls, the organizational chart below provides a visual display of the civilian’s depth 
of control over the military in American democracy. 
 
Figure 3.   Civilian Layers of Control Over the Military in America’s Democracy. 
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In this illustration, one can see the multiple layers of civilian
ht of the military by both the Executive and Legislative Branches. It also provides 
a clear view of the direct line of civilian authority and control of the military apparatus 
from the president to the various secretaries. Although the various Secretaries have more 
face-to-face contact with the military commanders than the president, it does not decrease 
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or degrade the president’s authority and responsibility as commander-in-chief. Located 
on the right side of the model, the various sections provide an indirect yet additional layer 
of civilian control of the military, because this is where the decisions of national security 
are made, which ultimately affect the military. Included on the left side of the model, the 
legislative controls are shown as a separate element and will be discussed later in Section 
E, of this chapter.  
2.  Layers of Control, The Parliamentary and the Ministry of Defense 
d’s 
most re
a amentary model of democracy, the minister of defense (MOD) fulfills 
the sam
 the democratically elected 
nse  
                                                
Of the different variations of the parliamentary models in existence, the worl
nowned form is that of Great Britain, which is also known as the Westminster 
parliamentary model.53 This model fundamentally differs from the U.S. method of 
governing in several ways, but three particular characteristics stand out.54 First, it is more 
responsive to the needs of its constituents, and second, it allows the removal of the prime 
minister with a simple vote of no confidence if he or she fails to perform satisfactorily. 
Third, the process of creating legislation is more streamlined because when the 
government sends legislation to the floor for approval, it is usually not open for 
amendments.55  
In a p rli
e role as the layers of civilians in the U.S. model, that is, “it serves as a buffer 
between democratically elected officials and military officers.”56  Thomas Bruneau at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School argues that the ministries of defense have apparently 
been created to achieve the following four main purposes.57  
• To structure the power relationships between
civilians and the military 
• To restructure, or define and allocate an arrangement of responsibilities 
between and among military officers and civilians 
• To maximize the effectiveness in the employment of the military forces by 
implementing policies in security and national defe
 
53 Manuel, Paul Christopher and Cammisa, Anne Marie. “Checks and Balances? How a Parliamentary 
System Could Change American Politics.” Westview, 1999. Pg. 16. 
54 Ibid. Pg. 19. 
55 Ibid. Pg. 105. 
56 Bruneau, Thomas C. “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations.”  Center for Civil-
Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Pg. 11-12. 
57 Ibid. Pg. 9-13. 
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• To maximize the efficiency in the use of resources: budget allocation, 












important for the consolidation of a new democracy, and Mexico is no different. When 
                                                
the  noted, the MOD can only be successful when given the initial tools and 
e of law to legitimize its exercise of power over the military.  According to 
Bruneau, the MOD can accomplish its role with the following four competencies: 
budgets, defining roles and missions, personnel, and acquisition of facilities.  At least at 
a minimum, and probably the most effective tool by which to control the military, is the 
‘power of the purse’ for training and readiness, as well as other issues.  Second, the 
MOD should be able to define the roles and missions of the military, which is the very 
fabric that determines the use of the military. 
The third competency is for the MOD
 type of training it will conduct to ready itself, based on the prescribed military 
roles and missions.  This is particularly important for Mexico because the function there 
is divided between the executive and the military according to Jorge Luis Sierra, a 
security specialist on Mexican military affairs.  “The Mexican legislative branch allows 
the president to take the lead in defining the missions and strategic objectives of the 
armed forces. Meanwhile, the military leadership assumes autonomy over defense policy, 
as well as determining the size, shape, and capabilities of the armed forces.”  The fourth 
competency addresses the training goals derived from the military’s roles and missions, 
and based on this, the MOD then acquires the appropriate equipment and facilities.  
Creating an organ of the government to establish civilian control of the militar
 
58 Ibid. Pg. 24. 
59 Ibid. Pg.15-17. 
60 Bruneau, Thomas C. “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations.”  Center for Civil-
Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Pg. 9. 
61 Ibid. Pg. 12. 
62 Sierra, Jorge-Luis. Chapter 3, “The Mexican Military Budget,” Pg. 28. Zinn, Ryan M. (ed.) “Always 
Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico.” Global Exchange and Centro de Investigaciones 
Economicas y Politicas de Accion Communitaria 2000.  
63 Ibid. 
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nother civilian mechanism for controlling the military apparatus of a 
 exclusive right to 
pursue 
hile the President of the U.S. is the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
and can pursu lly any means, including military action, the 
Congre
e includes oversight and accountability by the 
                                                
he right tools and the power to effect change, the civilian minister of defense can 
be made to bring about necessary and effective controls and oversight of the military 
establishment.  
E. LEGISLATURE’S CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY 
In yet a
country, in most democracies, the Congress or parliament has the
war action. However, what is important about civil-military relations is the control 
exercised over the military when a country is not fighting a war. In the U.S. model, 
members of the legislature serve as an additional layers of civilian control over the 
military. 
1.  The U.S. Congress 
W
e foreign policies by practica
ss maintains the exclusive right to declare war according to the Constitution.65 
This limitation on the president is important because war not only can deplete human and 
war making resources, but it also affects the economy, internal security, food supply, and 
other important aspects of American life. 
 Congressional restrictions over the military occur with actual controls, oversight 
measures and accountability. One measur
Senate (SASC) and House Armed Services (HASC) Committees. These oversights are 
carried out through investigations, by Congressional vetoes, mandatory reports, non-
statutory controls, and inspector generals.66 Another control includes budget 
authorizations and appropriations, and expenditure reports. One of the most impressive 
tools the Congress employs is their authorization and appropriation power of the federal 
budget, part of which includes the annual National Defense Authorization bill that covers 
the spectrum of operations of the Department of Defense.67  
 
65 The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 [11]. 
66 Davidson, H. Roger and Oleszek, J. Walter. “Congress and its Members.” CQ Press, 2000. Pg. 325-27. 
67 “Committee on Armed Services.” http://www.house.gov/hasc/about/oversight. Downloaded 17 April 
2001. 
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Congress can further exercise controls over the military through hearings on 
military issues, and confirming civilian appointees in charge of the military apparatus. 
The SASC and HASC committees conduct hearings, inspect budget line items, question 
dollar amounts, debate the overall defense budget and are required by the constitution to 
come up with similar budget figures in both legislative houses. Lawmakers further 
created the War Powers Resolution in 1973 as an additional measure to control the 
president’s use of the military apparatus.  
In U.S. history, the Congress has only declared war six times, while up until 1999, 
U.S. presidents have deployed troops more than 270 times to protect American lives, 
property and assets abroad.68 Because of this disparity, but more particularly due to the 
escalated U.S. involvement in Vietnam, lawmakers became skeptical of presidential 
initiatives abroad. In response to excessive use of the military by the executive, the War 
Powers Resolution keeps the president’s use of the military abroad in check by requiring 
that certain conditions be met.69  
• Consult with Congress before introducing troops into 
hostilities 
• Report any commitment of forces to Congress within forty-
eight hours 
• Terminate the use of forces within sixty days if Congress 
does not declare war, does not extend the period by law, or 
is unable to meet. 
Another measure of control by the U.S. Congress over the use of the military, 
relates to covert action and intelligence collection activities by the military forces. Covert 
action is defined as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence 
political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”70 Although 
people normally associate covert actions with paramilitary operations, they also include 
propaganda, political activity, economic activity, and support for coups.71  
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Congress has the authority to exercise oversight of intelligence operations through 
Article I, Section 8, and paragraph 18 of the U.S. constitution. Ultimately, Congress 
exercises control though the power of the purse, investigations, executive reports, 
hearings, treaties, nominations of the Director of Central Intelligence, and by withholding 
the budget. As a rule, Congress also receives prior notice of covert action from the 
executive office at least 48 hours before operations begin.72 When not informed 
beforehand, Congress eventually becomes aware of these missions because they take time 
to plan and often require large amounts of funds to execute those operations.  
Sometimes referred to as ‘the third option,’ before covert action can be ordered, a 
report of presidential findings has to be presented to Congress. These findings have to 
explicitly explain that covert action is necessary, and that achieving national objectives 
outweigh the risks involved.73 Unique to covert operations is the president’s legal right to 
plausible deniability whether the mission fails or succeeds.74 In fact, the objective 
attached to these missions is that of concealing the origin from which these missions were 
ordered. In the literature, one finds authors who argue that perhaps President Reagan’s 
lack of knowledge of hostages for arms in the Iran Contra Affair is an example of 
plausible deniability. 
Covert action is often conducted by the military, or the military works with or 
assists the Central Intelligence Agency. For example, the U.S. military collects 
information via the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), and the individual military services.75 Because of the military-intelligence 
relationship and the sensitivity of these operations, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(DSD) exercises authority over the military’s intelligence activities. The DSD further 
coordinates with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is also the director of the 
CIA.76 Because the responsibility of oversight is also divided in the Congress, the Senate 
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Intelligence Oversight Committee oversees intelligence collection by civilian agencies, 
while the Senate Armed Services Committee (composed of civilian representatives) 
oversees all aspects of military intelligence.77  
F.  CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, a discussion about democracy is provided in order to clarify what 
democracy is, and is not. Further, this author explains the steps of democratization and its 
transitions phases so that it is made clear in which phase Mexico is currently sitting in. Of 
greater importance is the discussion about the critical role a country’s military can play in 
the transition to democracy, given its prerogatives and institutionalization in the pre-
transition phase. What has clearly been established is that the military apparatus does 
influence the emerging civil-military relations in the new democracy, relying on its 
prerogatives to secure a privileged position and immunity from any previous 
wrongdoings. The case of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are just a few examples, but they 
do indicate that because Mexico is similar to them in the type of prerogatives it enjoys, 
that it also posses a threat to its democracy. 
 The section on the minister of defense in the parliamentary and America’s 
presidential democracy are presented as examples of how two different types of 
democratic models control their military apparatuses. Also, because many foreign 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School often wonder how two powerful militaries can 
be made to subordinate themselves to civilian control, even the limited explanation 
provided here could serve as a guide to others in emerging democracies as well. 
Furthermore, since the U.S. engages in the promotion of democracy abroad, it is 
appropriate to include the mechanisms by which the U.S. military’s role in domestic 
affairs are controlled. 
In the following chapter, evidence presented supports the argument that the 
Mexican military stands as a hindrance to Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. 
Articulable facts will support the claim that the number of military prerogatives enjoyed 
today, were legitimized and institutionalized many years ago when the military gave rise 
and support to the PRI. Because the PRI had controlled the military using a rewards and 
chanism for many years, the PRIs loss of control in 2000 punishment reinforcement me                                                 
77 Ibid. Pg. 33. 
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left a void of control over the military apparatus. Furthermore, it will be shown that there 
is a lack of executive and legislative controls over the military, and that decades-old civil-
military relations practices solidifies the military’s continuous prerogatives in the new 
democracy. Finally, evidence will show that the lack of executive and legislative controls 
over the military make it an autonomous institution, and capable of influencing public 






















 III. LACK OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS IN 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE FACE OF HIGH 
MILITARY PREROGATIVES  
In this chapter, Mexico’s history is discussed along with the current situation for 
finding any useful parallels to predict the outcomes of the current Fox administration 
while reflecting on theory. The main argument of this chapter is that there is a lack of 
executive and legislative controls over the military and high military prerogatives, a 
potentially volatile mixture to Mexico’s emerging democracy. However, in order to 
understand what is occurring today, one must first understand the history of civil-military 
relations in Mexico. This history will be followed by a discussion of the current military 
prerogatives, thereby showing that the only real change that has occurred in Mexico is a 
change of a political regime through free and fair elections. Finally, an explanation of the 
decades-old civil-military relations and the lack of executive and legislative controls and 
oversight is not only a danger, but also a hindrance to Mexico’s emerging democracy.  
A.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY-PRI CONNECTION IN PRE 
AND POST TRANSITION 
1.  Warring Factions Founded the PRI 
Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821 marked the beginning of unsuccessful 
efforts to stabilize itself politically and economically. In one push for change, historical 
political control characterized by dictatorships, military regimes, and violent power 
struggles from 1821 to 1860, gave way to at least 50 different presidencies.78 In another 
effort, these power struggles continued until its independence from France in 1867.79 
Finally, power struggles between repressive Caudillos such as Santa Anna and others, as 
well as bad economic conditions, brought about civil war between 1910 and the 1920s.  
The end of the civil war gave rise to the government of General Plutarco Diaz, 
and a short time later, the National Revolutionary Party (the antecedent of the PRI) was 
born in 1929.80 The military-PRI pact that emerged further put an end to armed strife in 
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80 Correspondence and interview via the internet with Jorge-Luis Sierra, security specialist on Mexico in 
Mexico.81 It wasn’t until 1946 that the first civilian president took charge.82 In fact, a 
group of army generals offered the presidency to Miguel Aleman, but he only accepted 
under the condition that he would grant absolute cooperation and respect for the military 
institution.83 In this case, the civilian president felt compelled to offer a privileged status 
to the military for the standing he was offered. As a result, it became an unwritten rule 
that the military in turn would reciprocate such loyalty to the chief executive. 
Initially, the new civilian executive and the military were equal in status until the 
PRI later made the military subordinate to it, but at a price. In return for subordination 
and loyalty, the military was allowed many prerogatives that resulted in an autonomous 
military.  Such prerogatives included exclusive control and secret budgets, and insulation 
from legislative and judicial controls. This undemocratic practice of cooptation in return 
for loyalty set the relationship tone between the executive and the military, which still 
exists today, even after the historic transition to democracy.  
2.  PRI-Military Relationship: Then and Now 
The unique history of the military-PRI relationship begs the question of whether 
the military is still loyal to the party, and therefore, a danger to Mexico’s consolidation of 
a multi-party democracy. The mutual supporting relationship between the PRI and the 
military in Mexico gave the PRI a long successful history of controlling the political 
machine, society, and the military establishment. It is no secret that the control of the 
military and its coercive powers in society was key to the PRI’s extended rule over 
Mexican politics. Recently, a Mexican government official supported this claim when he 
discussed the history of this relationship during a panel discussion on Legislatures and 
Defense in Washington, D.C. “In return for its loyalty and abdication to head executive 
powers, the civilians conceded autonomy and independence [to the military].”84  
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As a result, the PRI-military relationship became too mature and entrenched, and 
too successful to believe that after a transition in 2000, the military’s loyalty to the PRI 
no longer exists. It is precisely the military’s loyalty to the PRI through rewards and 
punishment reinforcements that made possible the successful control of the military 
without having to establish democratic controls. Also, it is loyalty as described below, 
and the lack of democratic controls, which presents one aspect as to why the military 
today stands as a hindrance to Mexico’s consolidation of democracy.  
The PRI won the military’s loyalty through the assignment of political 
appointments to active-duty generals such as the Secretary of National Defense, and other 
appointments within the military down to the Division Commander level. By selecting 
certain officers to the president’s cabinet, the PRI could count on using the military to 
support its rigged election schemes, repress riots and armed movements, and to continue 
their political control in the country. However, when rewards for loyalty were not 
effective, loyalty was ensured in others by convicting dissenting generals in a court of 
law. Numerous U.S. State Department records during the World War II timeframe alone 
indicate a trend in the way that the PRI exercised excessive and undemocratic means of 
control over the military. In communications by the State Department and the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico, it was stated that Generals Jose Domingo Ramirez Garrido and 
Alfredo Lezama Alvarez were sent to Mexico City to stand trial, presumably for not 
following orders [of transfers].85  
In yet another display of control, the PRI manipulated the military by transferring 
whole units from one region to another, for fear that the troops would be too friendly with 
civilians if forced to quell problems. This evidence is found in the following U.S. 
Embassy communiqué. 
“Transfer of Mexican troops: …soldiers in Sonora and along the 
international boundary has been increased; that soldiers at Naco have been 
transferred to Agua Prieta to fronteras [border areas]. Dispatch also 
mentions that supporters of General Camacho and General Almazan are 
predicting trouble during the election and the transfers were effected to be 
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sure that in case of trouble the soldiers would not be too friendly to the 
people.”86 
In a final example, when the PRI perceived a hint of disloyalty by military 
generals in those areas where the PRI regime was strongly opposed, the PRI took 
measures to prevent generals from supporting the opposition parties. Before elections 
took place in the seven key states or when trouble was suspected in a particular city, it 
was common to see a re-shuffling of military units. In another declassified record 
between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on May 17, 1940, 
the following discussion occurred. 
“Transfer of General of Division Matias Ramos. Jefe [Commander] of the 
10th military zone. Reports from the headquarters in Durango to Toluca [a 
distance of 450 miles straight-line distance, seven states away], and that 
the general of Division Juan Jose Rios, commander of the military zone at 
Toluca, has been assigned as jefe of Durango. It was rumored that his 
change was caused by the approaching election.”87 
In more contemporary times, and when faced with the eminent fall from power, 
the PRI once more attempted to manipulate military generals to remain loyal. During a 
confidential interview with Mexican military officers, they revealed that few generals lost 
their commands and attempts were made to prosecute them because they wanted to 
support Vicente Fox, then the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) presidential candidate.88 In 
a similar case, evidence suggests that the PRI, or those in the military who supported it, 
were still active in attempting to force compliance in others to play along the rules of the 
game. In April 1999, a U.S. immigration judge granted political asylum to Mexican 
Army Captain Jesus Valles-Bahena, after claiming that he would face persecution for 
refusing to kill Zapatista rebels from the state of Chiapas, Mexico.89 Based on two human 
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89 Jane’s, World Army Armies. “Current Developments and Recent Operations.” 17 November 2000. 
www.janes.com. 
rights reports and testimony from an expert witness, the judge found “reason to believe 
that Mexican security forces have tortured and killed Zapatista rebels and supporters.90 
Although the information provided above may be seen as forcing the military to 
compliance more than loyalty itself, there were obvious rewards for the majority who did 
follows orders in supporting the PRI. The reward and punishment reinforcement scheme 
used by the PRI were not conducive to the creation of democratic controls that would be 
mandated by the constitution and exercised by the executive and legislature branches. 
Considering the long established PRI-military loyalty, coupled with a lack of democratic 
controls, we can presume the existence of a “void” of control over the military during 
Mexico’s pre and post transition. 
3.  Is There a Void of Control Over the Military? 
The unique historical “link” between the military and the PRI nurtured for 71 
years created a bridge of association and dependency on each other. While resulting in a 
certain degree of peace and stability, the PRI’s corrupting system of control created a 
monopoly of the electoral process that undermined state and national politics.91 The 
practice of free and fair elections leading to the first democratically elected government 
has left a void of control over the military today.  
As illustrated below, the bond between the PRI, the executive (placed there by 
the PRI), and the military (which served as a loyal subject) (on the left) was the bridge 
that linked civil-military relations in Mexico. 
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Pre Transition to Democracy Post Transition to Democracy 
Bridge of Association and Dependency Between Civil Society and the Military: Pre 
and Post Transition to Democracy 
Figure 4.   Pattern of Dependency in Pre and Post Democracy Mexico. 
Since two important pieces of the triad that made up the previous authoritarian regime are 
not in power, democratic controls are the existing void in civil-military relations today. 
As mentioned previously, the long-established relationship between the PRI and the 
military is one element that could pose a threat to Mexico’s democracy because of the 
‘void’ of control. Nevertheless, President Fox and his new transition team quickly 
adopted the same methods of control over the military that were used by the PRI for 71 
years. 
B.  HIGH MILITARY PREROGATIVES 
 The prerogatives enjoyed by the military for many years during the pre-transition 
to democracy came about because of the PRI’s strategy towards the military, and with 
time, increased in number and impact. The military in Mexico gained their prerogatives 
because of their historic PRI-military relationship, the increase of their roles and missions 
in society; and the lack of executive and legislative controls. The less restrictions the 
military enjoyed since 1929, the more ground it gained. What resulted was a military with 
high autonomy and influence over the polity and society and because of this, remained an 
untouchable force in society.  
 After the transition to democracy in December 2000, the military kept its previous 
prerogatives and are now increasingly becoming legitimized by the new president. The 
table below provides a list of those prerogatives currently enjoyed by the Mexican 
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military, and which are the direct causes for concern about them standing as a hindrance 
in Mexico’s consolidation of democracy today. Very simply, these prerogatives run 
counter to the democratic process. 
Military relationship to the chief executive Role in the legislature 
Active-duty military participation in the cabinet Role in defense enterprises 
Role in intelligence collection on civilians Role in military promotions 
Role in police functions: counter drug and crime 
control 
Role in humanitarian-type missions as proving basic 
health care, and build roads and schools for 
indigenous peoples 
Coordination of defense sectors and responsible for 
internal security in counter insurgency and terrorism 
The military budget is shielded from being meddled 
with by the legislature  
Figure 5.   Current Military Prerogatives Hindering Mexico’s Consolidation Of Democracy. 
The cabinet positions currently filled by active duty generals, which gives them a 
unique relationship to the chief executive, influence policies affecting the military and 
solidify their prerogatives. Furthermore, that relationship also allows the military to have 
influence over public policies, since their main role in society is “internal” security. 
The military’s role in intelligence collection on civilians as a function of military 
units and the assignment of officers to Mexico’s Intelligence Service (CISEN) is the 
capstone problem in consolidation of democracy.92 It is public knowledge that by their 
very nature, intelligence organizations are secretive, and because of this, intelligence 
officers employ tactics that violate basic freedoms as they are known in democracies. It is 
for this and other reasons that intelligence organizations in democracies are “externally” 
focused. Intelligence in democracies has to have some level of transparency, but this 
norm especially applies to the military establishment of a country. When the military has 
a dual role as protector of the country and collector of intelligence on the very people 
they want to protect, it causes an implosion. What results are human rights violations, 
disappearances, and other atrocities, types of violence Mexico has already been 
experiencing for many years under the arrangement that still exists today. 
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A major role in police functions and the coordination of the defense sector by the 
military is another problematic area in which the direct result is the militarization of the 
country. The expansion of the military throughout the country and its increased role in 
society without democratic controls is like kindle, just waiting for that spark whereby a 
bold president or politician, will threaten the military and it will explode into the 
contestation of authority. 
 Mexico’s military plays a major role in defense enterprises, such as direct control 
of the manufacturing of their defense materials. The military also produces small arms, 
uniforms and personal equipment, ammunition and ships.93 Although the Mexican 
military also buys equipment and vehicles, they further modify purchased equipment to 
suit their needs. 
C.  PRESIDENT FOX AND THE GENERALS IN HIS CABINET: OLD 
PRACTICES STILL REMAIN 
The significance of changing old practices in civil-military relations in Mexico 
deals with the issue of, “Who is guarding the guardians?” The problem stems from the 
fact that the military is extensively involvement in domestic affairs and exercises political 
influence in society. Unlike America’s democracy, Mexico’s new democracy still does 
not have any additional layers of civilians in control of the military, layers that could 
serve as a buffer of security protections. 
1.  Political Appointments to Active Duty Generals in Cabinet Positions 
Since the 1930s, the military has been accepting political positions to the 
president’s cabinet, and at the very least indirectly influences civil-military relations.94 
Perhaps realizing the lack of democratic controls over the military, President Fox has 
attempted to ‘bridge’ the gap in civil-military relations by putting in practice what is all 
too familiar in Mexican politics. Currently, of the top 29 political appointments made by 
Fox, “four of them are active duty generals, a measure not conducive to civilian control 
of the military and the democratic process.”95  
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95 Ramiro Ramirez, Ph.D. Lead Researcher and professor of criminology at the Universidad Autonoma de 
While some have argued that Mexico’s military is apolitical, it cannot be 
discounted that they certainly do have political influence with those at the very top of the 
administration. After all, a political appointment to a key position in government whether 
a civilian or an active duty general, clearly indicates that political influence is exerted. As 
one example, General Rafael Marcial Macedo de la Concha, who was appointed 
Mexico’s Attorney General (AG), has policymaking powers that intrude into society 
backed by the force of the law. If a person, whether military or civilian is given a political 
appointment, has free access to the president, and creates and implements laws affecting 
society, one can conclude that that person is a politician; and when that politician is an 
active duty general, clearly, civilians are not in control of the military.  
In a prime example of the guardians watching the guardians, Mexico’s military 
leadership fits this description. Because Mexico does not have additional layers of 
civilians controlling the military between the president and the military (as in the U.S. 
model discussed in the Chapter II), military leaders themselves fill that void. The political 
appointment of Mexican General Gerardo Clemente Ricardo Vega Garcia as Secretary of 
National Defense, is an example of the absence of a ‘buffer’ made up of civilians, and 
therefore, not democratic. It can further be argued that General Vega Garcia also 
influences public policy by the mere fact that the military’s focus is in domestic affairs, 
and that any decisions he makes relative to the military, will affect society.  As a learning 
point in this area, Mexico should study the politicization of the military in the U.S.S.R as 
an example of what not to do to avoid similar problems. The former Vice Chairman of 
the Defense Committee in the State of Duma, Russia concluded that “the lack of a 
[civilian] buffer kept the armed forces ‘in politics’ and frustrated the ongoing efforts of 
military reform.”96 
In like fashion, the following two appointees also influence public policy and 
affect Mexican society by the military’s role in domestic affairs, particularly in the 
counter drug role. General Jose Armando Tamayo Casillas has functions equivalent to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S., and Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot 
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Gonzalez is the Secretary of the Navy. As military officers carrying out a defense plan to 
secure Mexico from an internal threat, any decisions and action they take will also affect 
domestic society as well. 
 According to Enrique Rojo at the Mexican Embassy, who quoted the Mexican 
constitution said, “no political appointment can be given to clergy or someone on active 
military status.”97 Upon questioning this quote in relation to one of the appointees, this 
official responded that “the attorney general (AG) is currently on leave from active duty 
[which is similar to the inactive reserve option for National Guard officers in the United 
States], a condition and term unfamiliar to civilians.”98 According to Rojo, the AG is also 
only exercising a technical function for the president and is refrained from making public 
policy. He further states that of the other military functionaries, which are also on active 
duty, they “simply relay orders from the president to the military commands in the 
field.”99 However, regardless of how the constitution is circumvented, the fact remains 
that the top military leaders are the ‘guardians guarding the guardians,’ another practice 
not conducive to democracy. As a result, without democratic civilian control of the 
military, democracy cannot be consolidated. 
2.  Lack of a Civilian Minister of Defense and Ombudsman 
Although the four main purposes of MOD have already been described in Chapter 
II, the issues discussed in this section counters Mexico’s military practices, and further 
supports this thesis’ argument. Like many new democracies, Mexico does not have a 
minister of defense (MOD), an important civilian body that would provide the additional 
layers of civilians in control of the military.100  
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A civilian MOD with the appropriate power to make and enforce public policy in 
Mexico would remove the troubling element of the military policing itself and control the 
legitimate use of force in society. If left unchecked, the practice of the military policing 
itself could lead to civil war or the further disintegration of democracy.101 Also, since the 
Mexican military has its own defense industry, requiring large budgets and personnel, a 
MOD would correct and improve the management of the nation’s defense and security. 
With the employment of lawyers, finance and other experts, the MOD can achieve budget 
transparency, privatize defense contracts, and balance the hierarchy of military 
departments into equal status, making them more effective and efficient.102  
Although separate from a MOD, the establishment of a civilian ombudsman office 
in military matters has been argued by some with the goal of serving as a watchdog 
organization. Considering that human rights violations have been conducted against 
civilians and soldiers alike by the military, the ombudsman could serve as a watchdog 
over the military establishment to protect those it comes in contact with.103  
3.  The Case of General Gallardo: Prisoner of Conscience 
The current Fox administration and members of the military are not exactly blind 
as to what should occur in Mexico’s consolidation of democracy in relation to military 
prerogatives. However, the question is “Do they want real change?” Evidence suggests 
that the new “democratically elected” president is upholding the military’s prerogatives 
despite obvious inconsistencies in the application of the rule of law within military 
circles. For example, the president has turned a deaf ear in the case of Mexican Army 
Brigadier General José Francisco Gallardo Rodríguez who, during the Salinas 
administration, publicly suggested the creation of a military ombudsman. The suggested 
duties of the ombudsman threatened the military’s prerogatives of autonomy and secrecy 
and for that matter, neither the previous administrations, nor President Fox today, will 
reopen General Gallardo’s case. 
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After publishing “The Necessity of a Military Ombudsman in Mexico”104 
(Translated from: Las necesidades de un ombudsman militar en México), General 
Gallardo Rodríguez was found to have committed a grave crime against the authoritarian 
regime.105 The general suggested the ombudsman’s main role should be the supervision 
of the actions of high-ranking officers and military administration, and to oversee the 
correct application of the military budget.106 He further suggested the oversight of the 
military in other areas, particularly those in which human rights abuses regularly 
occur.107 When the general’s paper was first published, rather than internalize his 
suggestions, the Salinas administration and military leaders decided to silence this 
innovator because he embarrassed the institution and the president. On November 9, 
1993, the general was arrested, tried in a military court of law, and convicted for the 
crime of slander, and defamation and slander against the Mexican Military per Article 
280 of the Code of Military justice.108  
Despite the recent transition to democracy, General Gallardo is still in prison and 
was recently labeled by human rights watchdog organizations as a ‘victim of conscience.’ 
The general has been labeled as such because the new Fox administration seems to want 
to forget the issue, rather than to do the right thing--reverse the general’s conviction. 
However, releasing General Gallardo would be an embarrassment and a blowback to the 
military establishment, an action that might destabilize civil-military relations at the apex 
of control during Mexico’s precarious consolidation of democratic. This case is a current 
example in which for the sake of retaining the military’s loyalty, President Fox will not 
venture into the military’s prerogatives; and thereby echoing President Aleman’s words 
and actions since 1946, that he would grant absolute respect to the military institution.  
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 C. THE MEXICAN CONGRESS AND ITS LACK OF MILITARY 
CONTROLS 
1.  The Congress 
According to Miguel Angel Centeno, the “Congress [in Mexico] has considerable 
constitutional powers but rarely challenges presidential authority.”109 These 
Congressional powers stem from its proportional representation system, arguably more 
democratic than the U.S. model because in theory, it is more representative of the people. 
The Congress is made up of 628 members and is divided into a bicameral system.  
Elected by Chamber of Deputies Chamber of Senators 
Single-member districts 300 64 (two per state) 
Proportional representation 200 1). 32 (first minority of second 
place party) 
2).  32 (majority) 
Total 500 128 
Table 1.   Electoral Representation of the Mexican Congress. Information Provided by Jorge-Luis 
Sierra, Security Specialist in Mexico.110 
This representation is a percentage of the number of votes by elected winners in 
each district, and currently, distributed among the seven political parties. A fundamental 
problem of this system of representation is the principle of no reelection for the members 
of Congress who serve three-year terms. This political arrangement is not conducive to a 
proper functioning of the government as suggested by Ugalde, who further claims, “One 
term in office does not encourage inter-elite competition, but promotes and sustains the 
domination by a single party and a small political class.”111 The political arrangement 
was “designed for a political system containing a dominant party and several minor 
parties of opposition, not for a genuinely competitive system in which an opposition party 
has a realistic chance of capturing a majority of seats.”112  
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Furthermore, Ugalde argues that the law against consecutive elections transforms 
the electoral connection between the representatives and the electors into a fluid 
system.113 This fluid system made it beneficial for political officials to listen to the 
executive rather than to constituents, [and through the reward system], became dependent 
on the PRI president.114 Also, since representatives cannot be reelected, they do not have 
enough time to learn their jobs well. Although Fox has vowed to bring about 
constitutional reforms to allow for the reelection of members of Congress,115 he still 
needs to solve the problem of how his new administration will be successful in their new 
democracy.  
2.  Existing Congressional Controls Over The Military 
There are limited controls over the military in Mexico, but they are not sufficient 
to restrain them. In fact, Mexico’s Constitutional powers share similarities with the U.S. 
model, but only as they relate to the creation and maintenance of the armed forces. For 
example, the Mexican Constitution gives Congress the following powers.116 
• Declare war based on the facts presented by the president 
• Raise and sustain the armed institutions within the union 
including the regulation of: the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
[including the authorization of the defense budget] 
• Provide regulations with the object of arming, organizing, 
and discipline the National Guard, reserving the fulfillment 
of the officer corp. and soldiers to the citizens, and to the 
states the powers to manage it based on the regulations in 
art. 73. 
• The Senate has the exclusive powers to ratify promotions to 
colonels and above of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
according to art. 76. [One measure of control] 
• The Congress is also authorized to permit national troops to 
deploy outside the limits of the territory, and has the power 
to approve passage of foreign troops through the country, 
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and to approve the station of foreign troops for more than 
one month in Mexican waters (art. 76). 
• Has the power to give approval to the president in 
activating the National Guard outside of its respective 
states, and approving their use of force only as it is needed 
The Mexican Congress also has the power (on paper) to conduct audits, 
investigations, and to question the secretary of National Defense to determine if the 
defense budget was spent honestly and legally.117 However, the actual process by which 
the Congress could exercise those controls is not well explained in the literature, but what 
is abundantly clear, however, is that they have never been implemented. Despite the 
powers listed above, the Mexican Congress has not exercised its powers to control the 
military, and has not served as the counter balance to the president.118 These facts lead 
this author to ask, “Why was there a Congressional passiveness during the dominance of 
the PRI regime?” 
3.  Congressional Passiveness 
The Congress’s blind and tacit blanket approval of the president’s defense budget 
without debates, modifications, or oversight during the reign of the PRI regime is 
historically famous. Although the opposition began to question the presidents’ plans 
between 1980 and 1990, their budgets continued being approved without significant 
changes.119 The practice of rubber-stamping the expenditure plan has further facilitated 
the secrecy of the defense budget, and has enhanced the lack of oversight in military 
expenditures. Although these are the results of inaction, it is more appropriate to at least 
briefly investigate why the Congress has been passive for the last 71 years.  
Although the PRI is no longer in power, to understand the lethargic reaction by 
the Congress in military matters today requires the analysis of the previous political 
arrangement. Similar to the PRI’s use of the punishment reinforcement system against the 
military, numerous articles and testimonies have provided evidence suggesting those 
methods were also used against the members of Congress.  
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Coercion is one tactic of the persuasion argument that forced compliance to the 
illegal yet accepted political arrangement that allowed the PRI to dominate Mexico’s 
politics. In his testimony during an interview with El Universal, Jesus Ortega, coordinator 
of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), talked about how many presidents 
before Fox violated the Constitution, while Ortega himself was made powerless. “I know 
many cases of Mexican presidents, before this one [Fox], who violated the law and the 
Constitution. [In fact], “I was never able [or allowed] to exercise the right to disagree, for 
obvious reasons.”120  
What might obvious reasons be? According to Ugalde, there are several political 
reasons why the Congress did not act during the PRI’s 71 year-reign, but the most 
important one is PRI-led pressures on politicians. Unorthodox political pressure on 
politicians is one issue, but how far was the PRI willing to go to force compliance? In 
“Bordering on Chaos, Mexico’s Roller-Coaster Journey Toward Prosperity,” 
Oppenheimer suggests that even presidential candidates can be silenced if they threaten 
the PRI regime. In fact, on March 23, 1994, Donaldo Colosio, the man personally 
selected to be the next president by then President Salinas, was assassinated during a 
campaign trip, and other PRI members were soon suspected of having ties to the 
crime.121 Sometime before his assassination, Oppenheimer had previously quoted 
Colosio saying that many in the PRI regime saw him as an open-minded politician. Then, 
three weeks before his death, Colosio gave a speech that threatened the PRI’s old 
guard.122 In his speech, Colosio “criticized Mexico’s excessive concentration of power in 
the hands of the president, and had promised a series of democratic changes to ‘end any 
vestige of authoritarianism.’”123 As has been shown, lack of obedience to the PRI in 
Mexican politics could and did lead to death, but in more subtle ways, a reward system 
was also present and useful. For any key player in Mexico, non-compliance by penalty of 
death is an obvious reason to either comply with the PRI, or leave the political game. 
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Personal or political rewards gained by members of Congress after complying 
with the PRI’s demands also support the persuasion argument. Unfortunately, it is more 
difficult to find supporting testimonies or other references to explain this portion of the 
argument for the obvious reason that politicians would not admit to the taking of bribes 
or other rewards. However, considering the mountain of evidence supporting the extent 
of corruption among Mexican officials, the reader can chose to agree or disagree on this 
point. Among the literature, however, the reader will find cases where corrupt officials 
enriched themselves without fear of prosecution (as if a reward for their support of the 
PRI). In fact, illegal enrichment by officials in Mexico is so well known that when 
President Zedillo gave his inauguration address in December 1994, he felt it necessary to 
turn to his cabinet and say, “The government is not a place for amassing wealth.”124 In 
some cases, investigations into crimes committed by PRI members were purposely 
slowed so that people could escape. For example, the arrest of Daniel Aguilar (who killed 
Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, a PRI official) revealed he had been hired by Fernando 
Rodriguez, a top aid to then PRI Congressman Manuel Munoz Rocha.125 Upon his arrest, 
Rodriguez stated he had recruited Aguilar “on direct orders of Congressman Rocha.”126 
However, the order to arrest Rocha was not made for weeks to come, and then suddenly, 
Rocha disappeared, escaping prosecution.  
The reward system, at least for members of the PRI, can be explained in what is 
described by Ugalde as “meta-constitutionality.” The Mexican presidents would handpick 
parliamentary leaders and promoted loyal legislators, efforts that were then rewarded 
with appointments as public administrators.127 As to which tactic was more effective 
between reward or punishment does not matter. What is important is that the political 
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arrangement designed by the PRI and supported by the military and intelligence service, 
kept the PRI in power for nearly a century. 
 There is a strong case that there is a lack of democratic controls over the military 
in Mexico, and that as long as civil-military relations continue as is, the danger to 
Mexico’s democracy will continue. In the history of Mexican politics since the civil war, 
little has changed in the way the president controls the military. In fact, what occurred is 
that the president befriended the military apparatus and kept them loyal through a 
rewards and punishment reinforcement system. Today, the same old practices such as 
giving political appointments to active duty generals, ignoring their violations of civil 
rights and remaining unscathed, keeps the military from contesting authority. These 
methods of control are clearly undemocratic in nature and not supportive of the new 
democratic order that is supposed to became consolidated according to Sorensen. High 
prerogatives coupled with an extensive internal military role and countrywide 
militarization, is a volatile mixture that could spark disaster if a brave president or 
Congressman were to threaten the military establishment.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
 The military’s prerogatives and the lack of executive and legislative controls 
stand as an obstacle in Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. Also, the high prerogatives 
and lack of democratic controls is a volatile mixture that could explode under the right 
conditions, further threatening Mexico’s democracy. A threat to the military’s 
prerogatives by the president or the legislature is the only spark needed to explode into a 
military contestation of authority. Although the absence of a legacy of military 
contestation is why many argue Mexico is a stable country, that fact is only true as of 
1946, when the first president took power. Before that timeframe, Mexico’s civil-military 
relations were explosive. Mexico’s history further shows that the prerogatives enjoyed by 
the military today, are a product of the long-held parallel structures between the PRI and 
the military establishment. However, even though Mexico now has a new democratically 
elected administration, the president is relying on political appointments of active duty 
generals, the PRI’s age-old tactic used to gain the military’s loyalty. These and other 
tactics employed by the new president is an indication that the military is a much-feared 
state institution. Because the PRI lost political control in 2000, it has left a void of control 
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over the military that the current president does not have. In summary, the lack of 
executive and legislative control coupled with high military prerogatives, equates to a 
volatile mixture that stands as an obstacle to Mexico’s consolidation of democracy.  
 In the next chapter, the question of why the Mexican military is involved in 
domestic affairs is answered, but most importantly, explains the extent of that 
involvement. In fact, the military’s role in society and its expansion and presence 
throughout the countryside is turning Mexico into a militarized zone. When coupled with 
high prerogatives, lack of democratic controls, and domestic militarization, it is clear that 
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IV. SECURITY DILEMMAS AND THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF 
THE MEXICAN MILITARY  
As with most Latin American countries, Mexico perceives that the threat to the 
country is internal. However, the new democratic order in Mexico has not yet given way 
to roles and missions that can be characterized as being restrictive in nature while 
fulfilling only a support role in society. In fact, the military is essentially focused 
internally with little or no resources devoted to foreign deployment or defense against 
foreign aggression (except for a contingency plan for an invasion by the U.S., a lesson 
learned in 1846).  
In this thesis, I have argued Mexico’s consolidation of democracy is hindered by 
the military, however, Mexico may not yet fully realize the extent of this dilemma. So 
far, the Mexican government has only correctly identified the insurgency movement and 
illegal drugs as security problems, but not a subtler problem found elsewhere. As a result, 
a distinction has to be made between the two forms of problems facing Mexico today. 
The insurgency and drug problems are “external” from the government itself, initiated by 
individuals or groups in society, where the military as a state institution, is truly the 
Mexican government’s internal dilemma. Blindly, however, the government’s military 
response to the insurgency and drug problems only exacerbates the obstacle the military 
poses in Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. The barrier to democratization is caused 
by the increase of prerogatives gained by the military in the form of increased  
involvement in domestic affairs, and the militarization of the countryside.  
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 Therefore, in this chapter, the militarization of the countryside and the extent of 
the military’s domestic role in society is analyzed in-depth. First, however, a discussion 
explains the reasons why Mexico employs the military in domestic affairs, in which the 
dilemmas posed by insurgency and illegal drugs are their primary concern. Further, a 
discussion includes the military’s roles and missions in confronting these problems, 
followed by other roles and mission that are more intrusive into society and in the lives of 
ordinary citizens. The military’s role in performing the functions of other key civilian 
organizations further stands as a hindrance to Mexico’s democratization because other 
state institutions are kept from entrenching themselves. 
A.  WHY THE MILITARY IS INVOLVED IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
Although some would argue that a military role in domestic affairs reduces 
readiness and blurs the line between them and other key state institutions, Mexico 
perceives itself as having no other choice. Mexico’s demonstrated reliance on the military 
in many arenas is not compatible with a democracy, except for limited involvement in 
support of civilian authorities. Therefore, in relation to the appropriate use of the military 
in a democracy, why does Mexico rely on the military extensively? 
As a general indicator of the extent of militarization in Mexico, the complete role 
of the Mexican military can be summed up and depicted in the following four defense 
plans.128 
• Anti-Drug Operations  
• Internal Security 
• Disaster Relief 
• National Defense 
As a result of these four defense contingencies, all the missions planned and executed by 
the military in Mexico are designed to support such directives.  
While America’s ‘Achilles heel’ is the illegal drug problem, Mexico’s thorns in 
its side are internal security issues. Although President Fox does not admit this, his 
primary concern (based on his demonstrated actions) is the diverse insurgency 
movement, which can be characterized as social-revolutionary. Over the last ten years, 
several new groups have emerged, and even after Mexico’s transition to democracy, these 
groups explode bombs in protest almost monthly. Because 17 different groups have been 
identified and there is an increase in insurgent and terrorist activities, the Army is also 
heavily engaged in countering these threats. So great is the perceived threat of the 
insurgency movement to the old regime and the new democracy, that the military is 
involved in intelligence collection of civilians. 
Under the auspices of disaster relief, the military, and particularly the Army 
provide a heavy presence throughout the countryside in civic action and humanitarian-
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type missions. While the Mexican military does not participate in peacekeeping outside 
the national border, they perform a similar role inside their borders. 
From a personal observation, the main reason why the military is seen as the 
solution to all the internal affairs problems in Mexico is very simple--trust. In particular, 
the military has served as a national constabulary in Mexico City and other places, taking 
over police and drug enforcement duties because of the wide level of police 
corruption.129 For example, in one account of this corruption in the Federal District of 
Mexico City alone, “six out of ten crimes committed have involved policemen.”130 In 
March 1995, police officers in a patrol car attempted to rob a man at gunpoint after they 
stopped him in his jeep, but their crime was interrupted when armed civilians started 
shooting at the police. It was only after the gun battle and their arrest that the police 
officers learned that the young man they robbed was President Zedillo’s 19-year old son 
(and the armed civilians his bodyguards).131 These types of incidents have been used to 
justify military involvement in policing, leading some observers to claim that Mexico is 
turning into a militarized zone. The militarization is a realistic concern when one 
considers the void of democratic controls, the expansion of jurisdiction, and the military’s 
increased role in domestic affairs. 
There is a wide spread perception that many Mexican government institutions 
cannot be trusted for reasons of corruption, ineptitude, or are under-equipped and poorly 
trained. A senior analyst on Mexico with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
concurred that the previous regime was plagued with corruption at all levels of the 
Mexican government, and in few cases, members of the military were involved as 
well.132 For the most part, however, Mexican troops, like most others militaries in the 
world, also fulfill a certain persona of psychological and operational discipline, loyalty, a 
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can-do attitude, and the adherence to strict orders. Enrique Rojo also acknowledged that 
“The [Mexican] military has inherent discipline, and organizational skills needed to fill 
that void [left unfilled by civilian institutions].”133  
B. THE DILEMMAS OF SECURITY AND ILLEGAL DRUG CONTROL  
While Mexico has many social problems such as poverty, unemployment and lack 
of higher education opportunities for it citizens, its security problems stem from 
insurgency and illegal drugs. It is these long-existing problems why successive Mexican 
governments have involved the military in internal affairs for many years.134 In the case 
of insurgency, the Mexican Government sees the military as the only state institution 
capable of dealing with them. While in the case of illegal drugs, the Mexican 
Government sees the military as the least corruptible among all other state institutions 
responsible for countering that threat. In discussing these problems, the main theme is 
that insurgent groups have posed problems for many years, especially in recent years, and 
illegal drugs have corrupted all state institutions.   
1.  The Insurgency Dilemma 
Insurgencies are not recent phenomena in Mexico, and just to illustrate one of the 
earliest uprisings from its history, consider the following example. In January 1940, 60 
Mayo Indians orchestrated an uprising after the government enacted new anti-religion 
legislation.135 Since then, however, the insurgent movement has transformed itself and 
their actions against the government have grown in intensity during the last two 
administrations.136 Today, of the three major security obstacles facing Mexico, 
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insurgency groups pose the most significant problem above drugs and crimes, since it is a 
disrupting social force that directly opposes the government and the military.  
Contemporary insurgent movements in Mexico can be traced back to at least 
1965, largely for reasons of social inequities and the repression of local populations.137 
Mexico’s insurgency crested from 1971 to about 1977, and although there was a lull in 
activity after 1977, it persisted at a low level after the 1980s.138 Despite severe 
government responses, insurgent groups sprung up throughout the country, training and 
equipping themselves and striking against the PRI-lead government and military forces. 
In recent times, the insurgency problem has been so significant that the military has 
found itself mobilizing more troops in mass to combat their attacks on the government.139 
In the history of Mexico’s insurgency, perhaps the one that has caused the biggest 
problem in one single action was the Ejersito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN). On 
the eve of the inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Mexico and the U.S., armed rebels of the EZLN initiated a coordinated attack 
and seized four towns and several villages.140 After the takeover of that region, Jefe 
Felipe proclaimed that the action was a “declaration of war on the federal army of 
Mexico, [the] basic pillar of the dictatorship we suffer under, led by the party in power 
and headed by the executive power that today is in the hands of [a] maximum and 
illegitimate leader, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.”141  
What was intriguing about the EZLN coordinated attack is that it was a blow 
against the government at a strategic place—Chiapas. The state of Chiapas is one of 
Mexico’s richest in natural resources, yet one of its poorest. Chiapas supplies 60 percent 
of Mexico’s hydroelectric power, 47 percent of its natural gas, and 21 percent of the 
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country’s oil.142 It is also one of Mexico’s top producers of coffee, lumber, and beef.143 
Although President Salinas initially tried to play down this uprising as one conducted by 
few poor peasants and not worthy of concern, the EZLN knew exactly how to bring 
political pain to the president. 
In August 2000, speaking on behalf of Mexico’s National Defense, General 
Gerardo Ricardo Vega Garcia proclaimed that the military understood the causes of the 
insurgency problem. “The danger of the guerrillas is found in the causes of their origin: 
poverty and marginalization.”144 In other words, Mexico’s poor find themselves at the 
edge of survival, and thus have been driven to the extremes of rational thinking. General 
Vega further stated that it is impossible to eradicate and dissolve the guerrillas using 
military force, and that the only thing they can do is enforce the anti-weapons and 
explosives laws to reduce their attacks. Despite this ‘understanding,’ the military has had 
to remain active in this area because the guerrilla movements are still springing up and 
unleashing violent acts against the government.145 
As Mexico struggles to transition to democracy today, insurgency groups pose a 
menacing problem because they are again becoming more active, bold and violent, even 
after President Fox took office. What is apparent is a trend that seems to be picking up 
momentum in Mexico as evidenced in increased activities and explosions over the last 
few years. Consider the most significant insurgency actions listed in the table below, 
while a great number of smaller actions against the government are not listed. The point 
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Group Timeframe Event 
EZLN December 1994 Took over several towns in the state of 
Chiapas by force killing over 100 soldiers 
Popular Revolutionary Army 
(EPR) 
September, 1996 Carried out more than a dozen attacks 
against military and police posts 
EPR June, 1997 Ambushed a military-anti-drug patrol 60 
kilometers West of Acapulco 
Table 2.   Information Obtained from Jane’s, World Army Armies. “Current Developments and Recent 
Operations.” 17 November 2000. WWW.jane’s.com. 
The fact that new groups have been identified since 2000, and covered in the section on 
Emerging Trends, is perhaps an indication that the insurgency movement will continue.  
2.  The Mexican Dilemma of Illegal Drugs  
In a few words, illegal drugs corrupt government elites and institutions, resulting 
in a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The growth in these problems was a sign 
that the authoritarian grip under the old regime was already in the process of breaking 
down.  
 Police institutions at local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have been 
corrupted to the core due to the influence of illegal drugs. In 1995, the Mexican attorney 
general’s office reported that 10 percent of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) had been 
fired or suspended in a three-year timeframe due to ties with the drug cartels.146 In many 
cases, police in Mexico are asked by drug runners to turn the other way in return for some 
amount of money, and when they don’t, they are threatened with their lives. Sometimes 
police are simply threatened without being offered a bribe, but the result is the same—
corruption by participation or by force. According to Andres Oppenheimer, some official 
in Mexico estimate that about 50 percent of the PJF were making money from drug 
traffickers.147  
The political arena has also fallen prey to corruption due to the illegal drug 
problem. In September 1994, Raul Salinas, the brother of then Mexican President, was 
arrested for the murder of PRI official Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu and for illegal 
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enrichment.148 Ten months later, his wife was arrested trying to withdraw money from 
Swiss banks under a false name, and officials later discovered over $300 million in 
various accounts.149 Eventually, Raul Salinas was sentenced to 50 years in prison. In 
another drug-political example, in August 1999, former Mexican Deputy Attorney 
General Mario Ruiz Massieu (brother of murdered PRI official) was indicted by a court 
in Houston, Texas on narcotics and money laundering charges and had previously been 
connected to over $7.9 million in U.S. accounts.150 Subsequently, and to avoid 
prosecution, Mario Riuz ended his life by overdosing on anti-depressant pills right before 
his trial.151 
 Although more disciplined than police and politicians, the military has also been 
shown not to be immune from taking bribes by drug dealers. Few have been corrupted, 
but those who have fallen include top military leaders. For example, in August 2000, 
Generals Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro and Francisco Humberto Quiros Hermosillo 
were arrested for having ties to the Juarez cartel.152 Also, only weeks after his 
appointment as the new head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD), Army 
General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo was also arrested for having direct collaboration with 
Amado Carrillo Fuentes, head of the Juarez cartel.153 Despite these setbacks for the 
military, the Mexican’s believe this institution has not yet been corrupted to the core as 
other institutions have. 
In democracy, non-corruptible institutions do matter for the proper functioning of 
government. When institutions charged with carrying out a specific function in society 
for society lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, it results in a loss of trust. When 
those who are charged with upholding the law or running the country do not play by the 
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rules, it leads the public to wonder why they should abide by the law. This corruption, 
which is prevalent among key institutions and elites in Mexico, could, in the future, 
conceivably lead to a breakdown of society because the additional corruption among 
police and politicians is a legacy in Mexico. These are strong indications as to why the 
military has been involved in countering the drug problem for many years, and why their 
roles and missions have been increased. 
C.  THE MILITARY’S ROLES AND MISSIONS IN COMBATING DRUGS 
AND INSURGENCIES 
Of all the other internal missions conducted by the military, counter drug 
operations are challenging in respect to the eradication requirements of the work, but it is 
certainly not a new mission. Historically, at least since 1933, the Mexican army has been 
counted on to destroy the production of marijuana and poppy fields, acts that resulted in 
thousands of hectares being destroyed.154 Also, not new to the military, is that by 1940, 
U.S.-Mexican relations had already been well established in the fight against drug 
trafficking.155  What is new, is that important aspects of the military have been modified 
to counter the threat posed by insurgency groups and drug gangs. 
1.  The Expansion of the Military   
After the end of the Mexican revolution in 1924, the military’s composition was 
patterned into the following four theaters of operation: The Central, Northwest, 
Northeast, and the Southwest Theater of Operations. These theaters were then divided 
into 10 Military Regions to fulfill their roles more efficiently. However, in response to 
insurmountable drug and insurgency problems, the Mexican Government has allowed the 
military to further expand its roles and missions in domestic affairs. 
Since the middle 1970s, the army has been continuously expanding and increasing 
its role in counter drug operations. Today, the Mexican army has approximately 130,000 
soldiers who are concentrated mostly in major population centers, including the federal 
capital, Guadalajara and Oaxaca.156 Because of their increased involvement throughout 
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Mexico in countering illegal drugs, the military has been more effective than the police, 
deploying about 3,000 men at all times and frequently as many 16,000.157 If additional 
manpower were to be needed for this mission in the future, the military could tap into its 
steady number of militia conscripts of approximately 60,000, much like the National 
Guard of the United States.158  
The “1995 Mexican Army and Air Force Development Plan” announced by the 
Zedillo administration (1994-2000) and the National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA), 
gave the military direct participation in counter drug operations.159 This change in policy 
further decentralized the command and control of the military and modified their 
traditional strategy and structure.160 
2.  The Military Structure at the Top of the Establishment  
At the upper echelons, the command and control of approximately 238,984 
members of the military rests with the president as commander in chief of the armed 
forces.161 With respect to the Army and Air Force, the senior Army officer serves as the 
secretary of national defense.162 This particular arrangement is similar to the U.S. Army 
Air Corp. during World War II. An Under-Secretary of National Defense, also a senior 
Army officer, has direct responsibility for the Army. His Chief of Staff, who controls all 
the Army institutions and units, reports directly to the Under-Secretary of Defense. 
Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Operations, who reports to the Secretary 
and Under-Secretary of the Navy, is usually a retired senior naval officer. The Chief of 
Naval Staff is in control of all naval institutions, bases, territorial commands and units, 
and reports to the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Operations. 
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3.  Decentralization of Command and Control  
In the lower echelons of the military, there is decentralization of command and 
control in order to improve the effectiveness of planning and executing counter drug and 
insurgency operations.163 One indicator of this decentralization is the creation of a 
coordination center for countering the drug threat, away from traditional military lines of 
authority. Also, each individual military department has further decentralized their 
command and control, measured by a significant increase of their presence throughout 
Mexico by expanding their areas of operation (or jurisdiction). For example, Operacion 
Azteca and Frontera respectively, have been successful in addressing the restoration of 
internal order and security of vital installations and civic action programs at lower 
operational levels.164  
The development of an “Inter-Agency Coordination Center” headed by the 
Attorney General’s Office, has decentralized the command and control of the military 
forces to improve coordination in counter drug operations.165 From this center, the 
Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) coordinates military responses with airborne, 
land and amphibious missions. Also, from this center, all other government land and air 
assets, as well as maritime and amphibious interdiction units are coordinated to counter 
the drug threat. In addition, the center serves as a specialized training center, and an all-
inclusive radar information collection and analysis system. Individually, the presence of 
Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel have been arrayed throughout Mexico to better 
counter the two major security threats—insurgency and illegal drugs. 
a.  Army’s Strength and Strategic Emplacement 
The Army has restructured its tactical deployment of troops and units by 
including two additional military regions and expanding the military zones to 44 from 20, 
in order to more adequately cover the areas experiencing heavy drug traffic.166  The new 
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12 military regions shown in the table below, further demonstrate the decentralization of 
major commands, each responsible for their military zones.  
Region Head Quarters in; City State Regions Commanded By: Inclusive Military Zones
1 Distrito Federal Mexico
Jose Algel Garcia Elizalde, Div. 
Comdr. General 1,22,23,24,37
2 Mexicali Baja California
Rigoberto Castillejos Adriano, 
Div. Comdr. General 2,3,4,40
3 Mazatlan Sinaloa
Enrique Tomas Salgado Cordero, 
Div. Comdr. General 9,10
4 Monterrey Nuevo Leon
Jose Domingo Ramirez Garrido 
Abreu, Div. Comdr. General 7,8,12
5 Guadalajara Jalisco
Gaston Menchaca Arias, Div. 
Comdr. General 11,13,14,15,20,41
6 La Boticaria Veracruz
Luis Montiel Lopez, Div. Comdr. 
General 18,19,25,26
7 Tuxtla Gutierres Chis
Abraham Campos Lopez, Div. 
Comdr. General 29,30,31,36,38,39
8 Ixtepec Oaxaca
Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez, 
Div. Comdr. General 28,44
9 Cumbres de Llano Largo Guerrero Mario Lopez Gutierrez 27,35
10 Merida Yucatan Felipe Bonilla Espinabarros 32,33,34
11 Torreon Coahuila
Mario Renan Castillo Fernandez, 
Div. Comdr. General 5,6,42
12 Irapuato Guanajuato
Jose Francisco Javier Sandoval 
Gutierrez, Div. Comdr. General 16,17,21,43
Table 3.   Location of Major Commands for The Mexican Army by Region Number. National 
Defense (SEDENA) Website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001. 
This structure is much like the Commanders-in-Chiefs of the various U.S. commands 
throughout the world such as Southern Command and others. It is important to point out 
that throughout the military regions, there is no civilian authority directing or monitoring 
their involvement in internal security. 
According to Jane’s Information Group, the present order of battle cannot 
be accurately determined since the Mexican military is currently conducting 
reorganization and reshuffling of its forces.167 Nevertheless, as of 1999, the Mexican 
army was further divided into 44 Military Zones and was arrayed into strategic locations 
as shown in the table below and illustrated in Map Two in the page that follows. 
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Zone Number City State Commander
1 Tacubaya Mexico, D.F. Sergio Ayon Rodriguez, Brigadier Gen.
2 Tujuana Baja California David Roberto Barcena Rios, Brigadier Gen.
3 La Paz Baja California Mauricio Avalia Median, Brigadier Gen.
4 Hermosillo Sonora Marcelino Mendoza Jardines, Brigadier Gen.
5 Chihuahua Chihuahua Guillermo Galvan Galvan, Brigadier Gen.
6 Saltillo Coahuila Francisco Armando Meza Castro, Brigadier Gen.
7 Escobedo Nuevo Leon Arturo Olgin Hernandez, Brigadier Gen.
8 Reynosa Tamaulipas Luis Roberto Gutierrez Flores, Brigadier Gen.
9 Culiacan Sinaloa Francisco Moreno Gonzalez, Brigadier Gen.
10 Durango Durango Jorge Issac Jimenez Garcia, Brigadier Gen.
11 Guadalupe Zacatecas Joaquin Taboada Martinez, Brigadier Gen.
12 San Luis Potosi San Luis Potosi Bernardo Segura Nieto, Brigadier Gen.
13 Tepic Nayarit Arturo Perez Cabello, Brigadier Gen.
14 Aguascalientes Aguascalientes Sergio Joel Bautista Gonzalez, Brigadier Gen.
15 La Mojonera Jalisco Fernando Cardoso Partida, Brigadier Gen.
16 Sarabia Guanajuato Hector lfredo Monroy Plascencia, Brigadier Gen.
17 Queretaro Queretaro Jorge Juarez Loera, Brigadier Gen.
18 Pachuca Hidalgo Humberto Eduardo Antimo Miranda, Brigadier Gen.
19 Tuxpan Vera cruz, N Lui Pineda Orosco, Brigadier Gen.
20 Colima Colima Juan morales Fuentes, Brigadier Gen.
21 Morelia Michoacan Jose Ruben Rivas Pena, Brigadier Gen.
22 Toluca Mexico Sergio Oscar Francisco Fernandez Barragan, Brig. Gen.
23 Panotla Tlaxcala Juan Hernandez Avalos, Brigadier Gen.
24 Cuernavaca Morelos Luis Angel Francisco Cabaza De Vaca Avalos, Brig. Gen.
25 Puebla Puebla Mario Pedro Juarez Navarrete, Brigadier Gen.
26 El Lencero Veracruz Salvador leonardo Bejarano Gomez, Brigadier Gen.
27 Ticui Guerrero, N Oswaldo Fernando Canto Gonzalez, Brigadier Gen.
28 Ixcotel Oaxaca German trejo Zozaya, Brigadier Gen.
29 Minatitlan Vera Cruz, S Antelmo Jimenez Jimenez, Brigadier Gen.
30 Villahermosa Tabasco Francisco Arriola Arriola, Brigadier Gen.
31 Rancho Nuevo Chiapas, N Hextor Sanchez Gutierres, Brigadier Gen.
32 Villadolid Yucatan Alfredo Fregoso Cortes, Brigadier Gen.
33 Campeche Campache Adrian Maldonado Ramirez, Brigadier Gen.
34 Chetumal Quintana Roo Sergio Aponte Polito, Brigadier Gen.
35 Chilpancingo Guerrero, S Arturo Galindo Romero, Brigadier Gen.
36 Tapachula Chiapas, S Jose de Jesus Humberto Rodriguez Martinez, Brig. Gen.
37 Santa Lucia Mexico Juan Alfredo Oropeza Garnica, Brigadier Gen.
38 Tenosique Tabasco Manuel Sanchez Aguilar, Brigadier Gen.
39 Ocosingo Chiapas Federico Juarez Santos, Brigadier Gen.
40 Guerrero Negro Baja California Sur Sergio Lopez Esquer, Brigadier Gen.
41 Puerto Ballarta Jalisco Carlos Garcia Priani, Brigadier Gen.
42 Santa Gertrudis Chihuahua Julian David Rivera Breton, Brigadier Gen.
43 Apatzingan Michoacan Sergio Magana Mier, Brigadier Gen.
44 Miahuatlan Oaxaca Gilberto Toledano Sanchez, Brigadier Gen.
Table 4.   Military Zones of the Mexican Army and Names of Current Zone Commanders. National 




 Figure 6.   Map created CPT. Sergio Villarreal. Information obtained from National Defense 
(SEDENA) website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001. 
Today, the Mexican army still stands as a very visible figure and the 
principle fighter of drugs in Mexico. In 1984-85, army soldiers manually destroyed 38 
percent more opium hectares than the federal judicial police and their helicopter spray 
ships.168 In January 2000, a writer with the Wall Street Journal tracked the daily activities 
of a Mexican army unit’s destruction of marijuana and poppy fields. “On any given day 
[in the year 2000], Mexico has about 36,000 troops—one out of five—engaged in the 
backbreaking work of eradicating the patches of marijuana and poppies that dot the 
country’s arid and mountainous backlands.”169 During an extended mission, this unit 
bivouacked in tents for six weeks to destroy a large field with eight-foot tall marijuana 
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plants, a particular type of work these soldiers see as a waste of time. Their commander, 
Capt. Lopez said, “We destroy the plantations, but they come back, again and again.170”  
The drug eradication program in Mexico has not only shown to be 
physically demanding work, but also dangerous. For example, the poppy-destruction 
work of another Mexican unit was temporarily halted the previous year when three 
soldiers were wounded and two civilians were killed, after opium growers tried to defend 
their crops. Apparently, yet silently, American officials do acknowledge the high risks 
and costs to the Mexican military in the war on drugs. After interviewing a U.S. Military 
Attaché in Mexico in 1989, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. was keenly 
aware of the many Mexican soldiers and sailors lost in drug-related assignments.171 
b.  Navy/Marine Strength, Training, and Strategic Emplacement 
Only a few years ago, the Mexican Navy had at one time approximately 
27,000 sailors including 1,100 naval aviation personnel, and 8,600 Marines.172 In their 
efforts to adapt to internal security threats, the Navy now stands at approximately 55,687 
personnel.173 Furthermore, in their efforts to expand their capabilities like the Army, the 
Navy purchased 40 high-speed boats to increase its efficiency in drug interdiction. By 
U.S. standards, the Mexican Navy is considered very efficient in their maintenance 
despite an aging fleet dating back to World War II era ships.174 Although the Navy 
normally patrols to control fisheries and protect oil platforms, it is also frequently called 
out for counter drug operations.175  
In order to be more responsive to the needs of the Mexican Government 
and to better counter the drug threat by sea, the Navy has also arrayed itself accordingly, 
and is displayed in the following map. 
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Figure 7.   Location of Naval and Naval Air Force by Zone Numbers. Information obtained from 
National Defense (SEDENA) Website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001. 
 
The geographical emplacement of the Navy is divided into two territorial 
commands, the Gulf and Caribbean Naval Force (HQ in Tuxpan, Vera Cruz), and the 
Pacific Naval Force (HQ in Acapulco).176 The Gulf Area is divided into three Naval 
Regions, and comprised of six Naval zones and eight Naval sectors as shown in the table 
below.  
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Naval Region Naval Zone Number City State
1 North East Tuxpan Veracruz
1 Ciudad Madero Tamaulipas
3 Veracruz Vera Cruz
3  East Frontera Tabasco
5 Frontera Tabasco
7 Lerma Campache
5 Caribbean Sea Chetumal Qunitana Roo
9 Yucalpeten Yucatan
11 Chetumal Qunitana Roo
Table 5.   Gulf Area Naval Zones and Regions. Information obtained from National Defense 
(SEDENA) website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001.  
On Mexico’s west side, the Navy is comprised of three Naval regions, and 
is further divided into 11 Naval zones and 10 Naval sectors. Table three below illustrates 
Table 6.   Pacific Area Naval Zones and Regions. 
the Navy’s strategic locations on the Pacific side. 
Information Obtained from National Defense 
(SEDENA) website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001.  
omprised of seven 
squadrons disp
                                                
Region Naval Zone Number City State
2 North West Guaymas Sonora
2 Ensenada Baja California Sur
4 La Paz Baja California Sur
6 Guaymas Sonora
8 Mazatlan Sinaloa
10 San Blas Nayarit
12 Puerto Vallarta Jalisco
14 Manzamillo Colima
4 West Manzanillo Colima
10 San Blas Nayarit
12 Puerto Vallarta Jalisco
14 Manzamillo Colima
6 Southwest Lazaro Cardenas Michoacan
18 Acapulco Guerrero
20 Salina Cruz Oaxaca
22 Puerto Madero Chiapas
The Navy also has its own Naval air support c
layed in the previous map, however, the one in Taecepan has not been 
confirmed.177 These locations are listed in the table on the next page.  
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177 Ibid. Pg. 23. 
Squadron Number City State
1 Chetumal Quintana Roo
2 D.F. Capital
3 Veracruz VeraCruz




8 Taecapan Not Confirmed
Table 7.    Mexican Naval Air Force. Information obtained from National Defense (SEDENA) 
website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. July 19, 2001. 
Although the Mexican Marines are mainly used for security of Naval 
installations and coastal defense, they have also been adapted to better combat the threat 
from counter-insurgency and illegal drugs.178 By infantry standards, the Marines are well 
equipped with U.S. and European-made weapons, and recently acquired 90 raiding craft 
and 60 Swedish Stridsbads boats.179 Some of these speedboats are used in counter drug 
operations because of their ability to outpace and overtake drug-smuggling speedboats. 
Many Marines have been reassigned to carry out police functions, a transition which only 
required them to exchange their uniforms for civilian clothes.180  
c.  Air Force Improvements 
In their efforts to also adapt to Mexico’s security needs, the Air Force 
increased their personnel by 2.15 percent in total manpower, which now maintains 
approximately 11,170 airmen. Although the Air Force recently did away with 55 old 
aircraft, they are gearing up for a fleet of armed helicopter gun ships. The Air Force has 
also been outfitted in the last few years with special aircraft to detect and counter 
airplanes carrying contraband within Mexico, including flights coming from Central and 
South America.181 
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The regions of the Air Force are divided into three sections, including the 
Center, South East, and Northern Regions as shown in the table below. Nineteen bases as 
shown in the following table, further divide these regions. 
State Region Area Region Comanders:
D.F. Center Region Juan Manuel Wonchee Montaño, Gral. Div. P.A. 
Chiapas South East Region José Dario Magaña López, Gral. Div. P.A. DEMA.
Chihuahua Northern Region Benjamín Pacheco Coronel, Gral. Div. P.A. DEMA. 
Table 8.   Major Regions for the Mexican Air Force and Names of Region Commanders. 
Information obtained from National Defense (SEDENA) website 
http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. Obtained July 19, 2001.  
 
Air Force 
Base Number: City State Commanders
1 Santa Lucía Mexico Sergio Parra Estrada. Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
2 Ixtepec Oaxaca Misael Orrostieta Díaz, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
3 Ciprés Baja California Jesús Andrés Delgado Morán, Gral. Gpo. P.A. DEMA.
4 Cozumel Quintana Roo Mario Castro Sánchez, Gral. Gpo. P.A. DEMA.
5 Zapopan Jalisco Roberto Bernardo Huicochea Alonso, Gral. Div. P.A. DEMA.
6 Tuxtla Gutiérrez Chiapas Leonardo González García, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
7 Pie de la Cuesta Guerrero José Sánchez Sandoval, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
8 Mérida Yucatan Manuel Victor Estrada Ricardez,Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
9 La Paz Baja California Sur Juan A. Villasana Castillo, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
10 Culiacán Sinaloa Carlos Torres Arroyo, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
11 Santa Gertrudis Chihuahua Conrado Armenta Castro, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
12 Tijuana Baja California Arturo Pérez Mejía, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA.
13 Chihuahua Chihuahua Sergio A. Escobar Juan, Gral. Gpo. P.A. DEMA.
14 Monterrey Nuevo Leon Terrence Emmett Ryan Garcia, Gral. Gpo. P.A. DEMA.
15 Oaxaca Oaxaca Julio Antonio Ponte Romero, Gral. Ala P.A. DEMA. 
16 Cd. Pemex Tabasco José Luís Irineo Saldivar, Gral. Gpo. P.A. DEMA.
17 Copalar Chiapas Eloy Humberto Astudillo Salazar, Gral. Gpo. P.A. 
18 Hermosillo Sonora Guillermo Ponce Ruíz, Gral. Ala P.A. 
19 Atlangatepec Tlaxcala Ricardo Flores Coss, Gral. Gpo.P.A. DEMA.
Table 9.   Location of Mexican Air Force Bases and Name of Current Commanders. Information 
obtained from National Defense (SEDENA) website http://www.sedena.gob.mx/. 
Obtained July 19, 2001. 
In late 1999, the Mexican government bought 73 Cessna 182 Skylane 
airplanes for reconnaissance and drug plantation eradication at a purchase price of $18 
million.182 In an effort to further modernize an aging fleet of helicopters, the Air Force 
bought five other airplanes that serve as aerial platforms equipped with state-of-the-art 
technology radar and electronic sensors.183 Further plans have also been made to 
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purchase approximately $500 million in military surveillance and technological 
equipment through 2001.184 
The Air Force also has a group of Grupos Aereos de Fuerzas Especiales 
(GAFES) [Airborne Special Forces Groups] assigned to them, and although they have 
specific missions, they are at the Air Force’s disposition as additional security forces.185 
These units are supported by the Air Force to get to and from a variety of missions. 
Although they depend on the Air Force for administrative purposes and transportation, 
these GAFES actually belong to a paratrooper brigade that only receives orders from the 
highest military command within the National Defense.186 The members of the GAFES, 
whose training will be discussed in the next section, were, as of June 2000, represented in 
strategic locations. For example, one was located at the high command, 24 of them in 
military regions, and 41 in the military zones.187 Also, it is believed there are groups of 
pilots who form part of the Special Operations Squadrons. 
3.  Army Special Forces Units and Acquisition of Equipment  
A particular noteworthy accomplishment by the Mexican’s themselves has been 
the creation of both the GAFES in 1986, and the Special Forces in 1995. Both units owe 
their beginnings to an airborne unit created in 1946.188  
The Special Forces are destined to fulfill a gamut of operations that guarantee the 
internal order of the country, defense of sovereignty, support to civilian authorities in 
disasters, and counter drug operations.189 A six-month training program prepares an all-
officer and all-volunteer force for Special Forces duty that includes training of 
conventional forces, but also to carry out their own operations as well.190  
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Their specialization includes a variety of training modeled after the U.S. Green 
Berets, and is particularly adept at counter drug operations. They receive training in 
small-unit tactics in the jungles of the state of Quintanaroo in the Southeast tip of 
Mexico,191 in what used to be Mayan country from 300 to 900 A.D.192 Desert training is 
conducted in the state of Chihuahua south of Texas, scuba diving and amphibious 
training in Guerrerro and other port areas, and parachuting and airmobile training in other 
states.193 They also receive additional training in mountaineering, basic medical training, 
and survival, all necessary skills, which are also suitable for the dangers of countering the 
drug trade in remote areas throughout Mexico.194   
The GAFES also form part of the Special Forces because they serve as a quick 
reaction force for counter drug and counter insurgencies, since they have specialized 
training in communications and light weapons. An amphibious version of the GAFES 
know as GANFES, also conducts underwater operations, and have specialized fast boats 
for countering drugs.195  
After graduating 20 officers and 30 soldiers from the U.S. Army’s Airborne 
School at Fort Benning, Georgia, Mexico established an airborne unit on July 20, 
1946.196 At the present, this group has grown into a brigade of airborne soldiers who now 
report to the high military command, who at any time can be ordered to respond to “any” 
situation.197 The airborne brigade is composed of infantry soldiers, some of which are 
also trained in High Altitude-Low Opening parachute jumps.  
On several occasions, Mexico has allowed its military to receive specialized 
training from the United States in counter drug operations, counter-insurgency, 
                                                 
191 Ibid. Pg. 9. 
192 Lombardi, John V. and L Cathryn, and Stoner, K. Lynn. “Latin American History: A Teaching Atlas.” 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983. Pg. 15. 
193 Secretaria De Defensa Nacional web site. [Secretariat of National Defense]. 
http://www.sedena.gob.mx. Special Forces section. Pg. 7-8. Downloaded April 19, 2001. 
194 Ibid. Pg. 8. 
195 Forecast International. Latin American and Caribbean Section. “Mexico: Analysis.”  June 2000, Pg. 4. 
Website: forecast1.com. 
196 Secretaria De Defensa Nacional web site. [Secretariat of National Defense]. 
http://www.sedena.gob.mx. Special Forces section. Pg. 7-8. Downloaded April 19, 2001. 
197 Ibid. Pg. 2. 
69 
intelligence and counter-intelligence. In 1996, upon the request of Defense Secretary 
William Perry, Mexico agreed to participate in modernized training, academic exchange 
of officers, and additional counter drug training.198 Counter drug training continues today 
within Mexico by those who have already been trained in the United States and other 
countries.   
4.  Shifting Units to the Borders  
a.  The Army’s Interdiction Role on the North and South Borders  
Mexico’s north and southern borders have been affected by the military’s 
expansion of its jurisdiction and presence throughout Mexico in responding to internal 
security problems. The realization that their borders are permeable to the transnational 
shipment of drugs has caused them to reorient their forces accordingly. For example, 21 
motorized cavalry regiments, 45 infantry battalions, and 24 infantry companies were 
relocated from throughout Mexico to specific areas along those borders.199   
The army’s presence in the southern border is required because of the 
particular types of tension that have developed there over the last few years. First, the 650 
miles of land it shares with Guatemala and Belize, two countries that are less developed, 
have posed an immigration problem requiring an active presence by the Mexican border 
patrol.  Second, because Guatemala and Belize are also used as transit routes for drug 
smuggling into Mexico, countering this threat requires the military’s expertise in 
conducting patrols in a jungle environment. Finally, Chiapas is particularly sensitive 
since this location is where Comandante Marcos and his Zapatista rebels are known to 
operate.  
While certain Army units attempt to put up a shield against drugs and 
undocumented aliens and guard against insurgents in the southern border, the mission in 
the northern border is one of containment. The northern border is by far more challenging 
in the Army’s fight against drug trafficking because the containment stretches for 2,000 
miles, and thus requires more troops. Although not alone on this border, since the 
                                                 
198 “Mexico quashes joint military exercises with the U.S.” Phillips Business Information, Inc. Armed 
Forces Newswire Service. March 19, 1996. 
199 FBIS translated text. (Internet downloaded 12 July from http://199.221.15.211). Document ID: 
LAP20010813000069. Title: Generals Seek Formal Status for Army in War on Drugs. Date of source: 
08/13/2001 by Mexico City “La Jornada.” Pg. 1. 
70 
Mexican Alfa and Beta border patrol/migrant protection groups provide an additional 
layer of police of presence,200 the fight here is still a problematic one. 
Furthermore, the military’s role in the northern border is more complex 
because of the added difficulty of conducting counter drug operations in heavily 
populated urban environments as compared to the less populated southern border. In 
addition, the Army’s countering effort there has to be multiplied because of the higher 
quantity of drugs from domestic and foreign grown that funnel through this area. Like a 
double-edged sword, the workload of the containment mission there is increased because 
the army also has to be on the lookout for loads of drug money and the smuggling of 
weapons being transported south into Mexico.  
D.  SOCIALLY “INTRUSIVE” ROLES FILLED BY THE MILITARY 
1.  The Military’s Role in Police Functions 
Of all the other roles the military fulfills in society, its involvement in police 
functions is the most visible because it operates in public view. It is also more intrusive 
of society because it fulfills a critical job the police cannot be trusted with. Consequently, 
the military’s role in this capacity further marks the potential of this involvement to stand 
as a hindrance to the democratic process. The subject of concern in this area is not so 
much the military’s support to civilian authorities in counter drug operations, but their 
actual fulfillment of police functions as agents of the law. This direct function is 
responsible for the great distinction between Mexico’s use of the military in domestic 
affairs, and those in mature democracies like that of the U.S.  
In 1996, during an effort to purge and realign the Public Security Secretariat 
(SSP), which is responsible for the safety of Mexico City’s residents, the government 
brought in the military. In this effort, almost “every major SSP official was removed and 
replaced by a military officer.”201 Starting from the top of the SSP, Division General 
Enrique Tomas Salgado Cordero was put in charge of that organization supported by five 
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colonels and lieutenant colonels, and 11 other generals.202 Three of these generals were 
appointed to newly created SSP posts including the Executive Director of Public Security 
Programs, Deputy Director of Operational Communications, and Director of Operational 
Logistics.203 However, Mexico City is just one example of the militarization of strategic 
areas to address internal problems. 
 Under the SSP, the Federal Preventive Police (FPP) was designed specifically to 
combat major drug trafficking and organized crime.204 According to Jorge-Luis Sierra, 
this group is lead by the military, and has a brigade of military police.205 In fact, in a 
massive raid on crime and drug trafficking in Mexico City in the summer of 2001, about 
18 thousand military, state and federal police agents were under the planning and 
direction of General Francisco Arellano Noblecia.  
 In other parts of the country, military personnel have also replaced members of 
the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) and State Judicial Police (PJE). For example, in 
December 1997, General Guillermo Alvarez Nahara was named the leader of the PJF.206 
In many instances, lower ranking military officers and former military personnel have 
also been assigned as police agents, since police corruption is found along the full 
spectrum of those institutions-from leaders to subordinates. In fact, Army officers 
replaced police leaders in the SSP, including Task Force Zorro, a counter-terrorist unit.207 
 Even after Mexico’s transition to democracy, President Fox made a controversial 
decision by continuing to use the military in a police role. The political appointment of 
Brigadier General Rafael Marcial Macedo de la Concha as the Attorney General of 
Mexico stands as the capstone to this continuing problem.  
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As if the actual fulfillment of police functions as policy that is counter to the 
democratic process is not enough, the problem that results causes another area of 
concern. The long-term involvement of the Mexican military as a national constabulary 
has led to human rights violations. The lack of training in police functions and human 
sensitivities has in many cases resulted in unnecessary and excessive use of force, and 
deadly force. Furthermore, the use of the military in a police role is a duplication of effort 
that results in redundant expenditures and should be reconsidered. Perhaps as a 
counterargument since the military is more effective than police in this capacity, 
disbanding the police forces might prove to be a cost effective measure. Savings would 
be possible because given the military’s capacity, it does not require as many personnel 
and equipment to accomplish the missions not being fulfilled by police forces.  
2.  The Military’s Role in Intelligence Collection 
The issue of intelligence collection alone is another major dilemma since the 
military’s connection to this arena makes the consolidation of democracy in Mexico an 
even more problematic one. To date, the literature has not revealed a connection between 
the military and intelligence collection in conjunction with civilian intelligence agencies 
in Mexico. However, during an interview with members of the Mexican military in 
confidentiality, this author has learned that the military assigns officers to the federal 
government’s Centro de Investigacion y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) [Center for 
Investigation and National Security] as operatives in order to gather intelligence on 
civilians.208 Unlike most democracies, the U.S. model forbids the CIA and the military 
from collecting intelligence on civilians because of constitutional issues. However, to the 
detriment of Mexico’s new democracy, the government still allows such activities.  
Considering CISEN’s historical violations of constitutional rights due to its 
autonomy, the role of the military in this capacity indicates the situation was more 
problematic than originally believed. The new issue stems from the fact that information 
linking CISEN to political espionage, killings, kidnappings, and other violations of the 
law, implicates the military. This combination proved to be a volatile mixture during the 
pre-transition period, and because little has changed, this mixture is still problematic to 
Mexico’s transition to democracy. 
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3.  The Military’s Role in Civic Action and Internal Humanitarian 
Missions 
a.  Provider of Food, Medical & Dental Services 
In addition to other domestic functions, the Mexican military attempts to 
feed the hungry and provide medical and dental services in remote areas. Primarily, the 
military conducts these missions because those organizations charged with these duties 
cannot deliver those services, or do not have the resources to do so. During an interview 
with the Wall Street Journal last year, a Mexican general discussed the Army’s 
involvement in civil-military relations. “We do everything,” said General Jose Gomez 
Salazar, during his visit to an Army-run social-services camp where 100 Mayan women, 
many cradling children, were lined up to receive a prepared meal.209 Although seemingly 
non-threatening, one author questions the military’s function in this area. Jorge Luis 
Sierra, a security specialist on Mexico, suggests this mission allows the military to gather 
intelligence on the extent of social crisis.210 Perhaps a more appropriate question given 
the expansion of the military role and jurisdiction is to ask, “Is the military attempting to 
win the hearts and minds of the indigenous people?” If so, “For what reason?” 
The Army and Air Force also provide medical services to many remote 
areas because civil entities charged with these functions are inefficient. However, 
whether the military conducts these missions for intelligence or simply because civic 
institutions are not capable, the fact remains that the military is counted on to fulfill that 
role. The military’s role in this function also de-legitimizes other civilian institutions 
charged with those tasks. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Mexico is correct in identifying the insurgency and illegal drug problems as 
security issues they must face in full force. However, they do not realize that countering 
those threats with the military’s involvement to the extent that it is, is a costly mistake 
that further hinders Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. The military stands as an 
obstacle to democracy because of the extent of militarization as measured by all of the 
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different roles it fills in society, and its physical presence throughout the countryside. 
Furthermore, the decentralization of command and control of the military, the 
modifications and improvements it has made to effectively meet those threats, as well as 
the expansion of its jurisdiction has made the military too strong, and too autonomous. 
These prerogatives further endanger Mexico’s consolidation of democracy because even 
after the new transition, there is an absence of executive and legislative controls over the 
military. 
In the next chapter, we reassess the issues analyzed previously, since they are 
emerging as more problematic after the transition to democracy. In one area, the military 
emerges from the transition with a renewed counter insurgency and counter drug mission 
armed with explicit approval to collect intelligence on civilians. Furthermore, the 
intelligence services are unmasked, that is, every state in the republic has an intelligence 
service that functions without any federal executive or legislative oversight. Another area 
of concern is the transformation taking place within the insurgency movement into 
sophisticated groups, some of which could now be labeled as terrorists. Also, politicians 
who are just now learning to operate in a new environment of political freedom pose 
another emerging problem. For example, they could perceive any efforts made by 
politicians to impose constraints over the military as threats to their prerogatives. These 
threats could cause the spark that ignites the volatile mixture composed of military 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
76 
V. EMERGING PROBLEMS AFTER THE TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY 
 The new democracy in Mexico has not addressed the civil-military problems 
raised in this thesis. On the contrary, the situation has gotten worse, leading to an increase 
in the military’s internal presence and roles, and expanding military prerogatives. Rather 
than empowering civilian institutions and tightening the grip of the military 
establishment, as democratization theory would lead us to believe, the opposite has 
occurred. With the transition to democracy, the military has gained the additional 
prerogative of a legitimized role of officially collecting intelligence on civilians.  
Also, with a transition, one could expect the concerns of previously excluded 
groups to be addressed, but here too, the opposite has occurred. New insurgent groups 
have surfaced and claimed responsibility for attacks throughout Mexico since Vicente 
Fox took charge. Furthermore, because Mexico now has a democratically elected 
government, some previous insurgent groups can now be classified as terrorists, thereby 
increasing Mexico’s security dilemma. Finally, these groups are growing in 
sophistication in their methods and tools, targeting American-owned businesses in 
Mexico, thereby jeopardizing historically fragile U.S.-Mexican relations. 
 Politicians are just now learning how to exercise their powers in a new 
environment of political freedom. A lesson they will have to learn quickly is the impact 
of their Congressional powers, as well as a sense of proportion, especially in those areas 
affecting military prerogatives. As stated previously, the fact that military has not 
contested authority since 1946 simply means that the president or the Congress has not 
challenged the military. With renewed powers today, the president or the Congress could 
threaten the military’s prerogatives, a measure that could encounter a volatile mixture of 
military contestation and resistance. 
A.  THE MILITARY’S INCREASED ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTION 
As if the military’s previous involvement in society with police functions and 
some intelligence collection activities were not of enough concern, their penetration of 
society has just recently increased. The military’s reach is accentuated by a legitimized 
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role in the collection of information on civilians, a problem that further strikes at the heart 
of democracy.211 The military and CISEN are now officially partners in the collection of 
intelligence within Mexican society for the purpose of tracking down terrorist and 
insurgent groups, organized criminal elements, and drug gangs.212 To help facilitate their 
efforts, this intelligence collection task force has been cleared to eavesdrop on civil and 
political organizations by way of telephone interceptions, spying and infiltration.213 In 
order to understand how the military further hinders the democratic process in Mexico in 
light of their new role with CISEN, we must know how CISEN operates in Mexico’s 
society. 
B.  UNCONTROLLABLE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: CISEN AND STATE 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
The additional role the military now has in collecting intelligence is problematic 
because CISEN’s methods of operation also lack executive and legislative controls and 
oversight. In this capacity, the military is less restrained and more intrusive because as it 
learns CISEN’s methods, it further undermines authority and runs counter to the 
democratic process. An indicator that Mexico has a huge problem with illegal spying is 
the recent case in which CISEN spied on Fox, then a presidential candidate, when they 
illegal wiretapped his phones.214 However, that was not surprising since the PRI regime 
would traditionally give CISEN orders to spy on opposition candidates and other 
enemies. 
Mexico can be considered to have uncontrollable intelligence services not just due 
to their autonomy, but also in the quantity of those agencies existing within Mexico. El 
Universal Newspaper of Mexico City in July 2000 quoted the new National Security 
Advisor, Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer, saying there are many intelligence groups in Mexico.215 
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In fact, in discussing a proposed National Security Law, Zinzer replied that ‘all’ states 
have an intelligence service.216 This information implies that Mexico is plagued with 
intelligence groups spying on each other. The literature on this issue further seems to 
indicate that each governor has an intelligence group reporting to them on their 
investigations and monitoring activities of politicians, businessmen, and social leaders.217 
In one example, while the federal police was investigating a kidnapping ring in Mexico 
City, they accidentally discovered an intelligence group (working for the state of Mexico) 
while they were conducting illegal wiretaps.218 Due to uncontrollable behavior in the 
past, the intelligence organizations have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the public and 
are about to get worse if left unchecked.219 
1.  Why the CISEN-Military Connection Further Undermines Mexico’s 
Democracy 
To further appreciate the complexity of the problem posed by the military in its 
new role, one must understand CISEN’s autonomy and intrusion of Mexican society in 
the pre and post transition. Furthermore, understanding how CISEN operates will give an 
indicator as to how the military will further undermine authority and the democratic 
process.  
During Mexico’s pre-transition to democracy, CISEN can be classified as having 
been a Political Police based on its Autonomy and Penetration of society.220 In his 
book, Peter Gill classifies intelligence groups based on their level of Autonomy and 
Penetration, and in this thesis, they are compared against emerging evidence about 
CISEN.221  
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During Mexico’s pre transition to democracy, CISEN can be labeled a political 
police because its autonomy is confirmed by several factors. CISEN was autonomous 
from democratic policy-making, was insulated from the legislature and judicial review, 
was responsive to the party (PRI) in power, derived powers and responsibilities from 
loosely defined delegations of executive power; gathered political intelligence unrelated 
to specific offenses, and conducted aggressive countering operations against the political 
opposition.222 It also enjoyed high autonomy because the government did not control the 
agency (but the PRI did), CISEN decided on the targets for espionage, kidnapping, and 
other methods. Also, CISEN decided how it gathered intelligence (unlawful wire-taps, 
surveillance, infiltration, and torture, etc), and how it employed its counter-measures.223 
For these reasons, CISEN can be classified as having a medium level of penetration, but 
cannot be classified as having high penetration when compared to the activities of other 
more repressive governments such as the KGB during the former Soviet Union. 
However, CISEN also met one of the conditions of the independent security state, in that 
the agency could select the targets for information gathering.224  
After the transition, CISEN became the subject of national and international 
attention as its secret files were opened to investigators who concluded several points, 
and confirmed many people’s beliefs. For example, evidence confirmed that CISEN had 
been responsible for many of the political kidnappings and disappearances of PRI 
political opponents.225 CISEN was further responsible for conducting many wiretaps 
without judicial approval, while also spying on ordinary citizens to collect intelligence 
without warrants or court orders. Furthermore, days before the inauguration of President 
Fox, CISEN is reported to have been recording the phone conversations of over 400 
people in Mexico City, and another 1,000 throughout Mexico; this is in addition to the 
400 million files of people investigated by CISEN since 1989.226 This evidence, together 
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with testimony that the military worked with CISEN during Mexico’s pre transition 
phase, is a strong indicator that the military has been undermining executive and 
legislative authorities for several years. 
During Mexico’s post-transition to democracy, CISEN can be classified as a 
semi-independent security state and political police. Although one would believe that 
controls would be established over the intelligence services with the beginning of 
democracy, for Mexico, no change has occurred. Given the lack of government 
legislation today, CISEN now enjoys more freedom from controls and oversight than 
before. As a result, if CISEN will continue unimpeded as it has been, we can predict that 
the military’s involvement with them will further run counter to Mexico’s democracy. In 
the table below, a comparison of CISEN’s autonomy and penetration is analyzed during 
the pre and post transition to democracy.  
Pre-Transition to Democracy Post-Transition to Democracy
Penetration Penetration




Security Regime Type: Political Police (P-P), Independent(I) Security Regime Type: Independent Security state/Political police
Penetration Method: Espionage, Persuation Penetration Method: Espionage, Persuation 
Intelligence service insulated by: Secrecy Intelligence service insulated by: Secrecy, more autonomy
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Figure 8.   Comparison of Mexico’s Intelligence in Pre and Post Transition  
  
In the post transition, CISENs future penetration of society is yet to be 
determined since modifications have only been talked about. To date, the government has 
only advised CISEN to exercise a self-imposed code of conduct as a control measure.227 
However, given the new freedom of the press and public awareness about CISEN 
activities, their penetration of society could be minimized to some extent. For now, 
CISEN’s intrusion of society, and for that matter the military’s intrusion in this capacity, 
can be the gauged as medium.  
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CISEN’s autonomy is still high, but is now legitimized based on weak 
government decisions. CISEN’s autonomy is considered high because the government 
does not have regulations in place to control the various state intelligence services nor do 
their activities have to be coordinated or supervised by a central authority under 
executive control. Furthermore, agencies are not linked in any way or combined in one 
group for the purpose of sharing information.228  
In summary, the new democratic government in Mexico has to date failed to 
introduce constitutional, legislative, and judicial controls and oversight over the 
intelligence services. Because of lack of democratic controls, CISEN and the other state 
agencies will continue to pose problems in society. Furthermore, the military’s official 
involvement in intelligence collection will only increase their hindrance of the 
democratic process, since they will more than likely adapt CISEN’s methods of 
operations. Even after Mexico’s transition to democracy, which in theory is a move 
towards more protection for its citizenry, no changes have occurred. 
C.  NEW INSURGENT GROUPS 
The insurgency movement in Mexico is becoming more problematic because the 
numbers of groups are growing and they are on the brink of forming alliances. Forecast 
International recently announced that four new groups declared themselves in Mexico 
sometime after June 2000.229 More recently, according to the same source, Mexico’s 
intelligence service identified 16 radical guerrilla groups having a presence in 16 states, 
backed by nearly 30,000 participants in 167 political and social organizations.230 On 
August 8, 2001, explosions occurred in three branches of Banamex (Bank of Mexico) 
caused by Fuerzas Armadas del Pueblo (FARP).231  
On September 1 2001, a new insurgent group and possibly number 17 in the 
country, the Group of Guerrilla Combatants of Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon claimed 
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responsibility in two separate explosions apparently aimed at U.S. owned businesses.232 
One explosion occurred at a Chevrolet showroom operated by General Motors in Mexico 
City, and the other at a McDonalds fast food chain near another Chevrolet showroom. 
Although only a few activities have been discussed in this section, many more examples 
made public indicate that insurgent groups pose a real threat in Mexico. Acts of terrorism 
also occur periodically such as when a car bomb exploded in Mexico City and in three 
other places, including one at the government palace of Acapulco.233  
There are indicators suggesting that some of these groups have a higher level of 
sophistication than others. For example, in a recent explosion in Mexico City near the 
American Express Bank, the seat of a bicycle was rigged with explosives and detonated 
from a distance with a remote-control device.234 Also, according to seized documents 
from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) and the Revolutionary 
People’s Army (ERP) by the Mexican Office of Attorney General, these groups claim to 
have experts on harmful chemical and biological weapons, including surface-to-surface 
and surface-to-air missiles.235 Because Mexico is one of the countries that produce 
Anthrax, and possibly other harmful biological and chemicals substances, it is plausible 
these groups do have such experts. 
Mexican insurgency analyst Juan Fernando Reyes Palaez, himself a former 
member of the “Communist League of the 23 of September,” said that members of eight 
confirmed insurgency groups met before the uprising in Chiapas in 1994.236 However, it 
is not known if these eight groups corroborated with comandante Marcos and the EZLN, 
but the mere fact that they met before that operation, should be cause for concern for both 
the U.S. and Mexico. The U.S. should not underestimate Mexico’s insurgent groups since 
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at least a few of them could be classified as terrorists, especially after considering the fact 
that some of their bombs have already targeted American companies. 
The troublesome groups in Mexico seem to be characterized as social 
revolutionary in nature, but their identification differs. “The hit-and-run tactics employed 
by irregular forces against a strong military normally characterizes guerrillas.”237 
Conversely, terrorism is often described as the use of violence or the threat of it, to 
achieve political objectives, and when such violence is intended to control a population or 
coerce a government into granting concessions.238 Furthermore, according to a terrorism 
expert, Professor Maria Rasmussen at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, it has also been argued that when people refer to terrorists, “we imply that the 
regime [in power] is legitimate.”239 Insurgents are also normally characterized as 
controlling some piece of territory.  
Therefore, the Zapatistas and other groups in Mexico can be considered 
insurgents, while other groups can be classified as terrorists because they are attempting 
to achieve some political objective with terror tactics against the legitimate government. 
In fact, from captured documents, the Prolonged People’s War Guidelines promote the 
“political and military harassment of the enemies: the government [of Mexico], the 
bourgeoisie and the Army.”240 
The most notable insurgent groups in Mexico’s recent history have been: Ejercito 
Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR), Ejercito 
Indigena Clandestinio de los Marginados del Pueblo de Guerrerro; Frente Magnista de 
Liberacion Nacional, Milicias de la Sierra Madre, and the Ejercito Revolucionario 
Insurgente Popular (ERIP). One thing that distinguishes these insurgent groups from 
t they are not known for tapping the illegal drug trade for others in Latin America is tha                                                 
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financing. Unlike the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shinning Path) and others, which 
have clearly been linked to drug organizations for funding, Mexican groups seem to take 
a different avenue. For example, a link has been established between some Mexican 
groups and terrorists from Europe, but a clearer source has been to bank robberies and 
kidnappings for ransom.241  
D.  TESTING THE WATERS: THE POLITICIAN’S DILEMMA OF 
EXERCISING CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY IN A NEW 
ENVIRONMENT OF POLITICAL FREEDOM 
With the new transition that began in 2000, the political institutions in Mexico are 
learning to cope with the new freedoms gained. A common issue for legislators, is 
figuring out how to play in the game in the democratic arena without pressure from PRI 
strongmen. In this new environment of political freedom, legislators have to decide which 
executive programs to debate, which to scrutinize, and which to support.  
Above all others, and central to this section of the thesis, it is important to ask, 
“Will the Congress establish legal mechanisms to oversee the military in Mexico?” Also, 
“Will the Congress debate and pass legislation to enable civilian-lead institutions for 
controlling the armed forces?”   
Both questions are central to the issue in Mexico’s new democracy, but legislators 
must first establish a common bond to bring about democratization. Speaking to a group 
of cabinet secretaries, governors, and diplomats, President Fox sent the right message 
when he appealed for a national political accord in July 2001. “A new accord among all 
political forces is urgently needed in order to consolidate democracy, banish every 
vestige of authoritarianism, and develop common ground on reform of the state, an 
accord that rules out inflexibility but also respects convictions.”242 In reality, however, 
president Fox only needs support from the majority, but even in this attempt, problems of 
human behavior occur. 
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In “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes,” Linz states that the disappointments 
and frustrations that appear in the initial regime-building coalition produce conflict.243 
Linz further observes that because government leaders become too preoccupied with 
constitutional and legislative debates in the new environment of political freedom, 
“implementation of such broad agendas tends to become practically impossible.”244 In 
one of several types of cases, the Mexican Congress recently filed a lawsuit against the 
president, claiming that Fox over stepped his bounds and infringed on the authority of the 
legislature by modifying the Regulation of the Law of Public Electrical Service.245  
Although it is healthy and acceptable for politicians to disagree and oppose 
legislation, there is a difference between loyal and disloyal opposition. By loyalty, Linz 
refers to a party’s commitment to the democratic process whether it is in favor or in 
opposition on a particular piece of legislation.246 However, Mexico or any new 
democracy should be cautions of any political party that is disloyal to the democratic 
process. Signs of withdrawing from the legislature and a refusal to participate in 
parliamentary debates can result in de-legitimizing the political bureaucracy.247  
Adapting and performing successfully in Mexico’s old but now unfamiliar 
political arrangement will be a struggle in and of itself for members of the legislature. 
Because this issue will stand as an obstacle for some time, there can be little hope for the 
rapid establishment of democratic controls over the military apparatus in light of its 
expanding jurisdiction, autonomy and increased internal role. Therefore, politicians and 
the president should exercise caution in their attempts to disarm the military from their 
high number of prerogatives. Because threats to military prerogatives have proven to be a 
volatile mixture in other Latin American countries, the Mexican president and the 
legislature should take measured steps at democratizing the control of the military. 
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E.  WHY DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS ARE IMPORTANT FOR MEXICO 
Juan Linz believes that when governments co-opt the military in order to gain a 
pledge of support, it indicates that the normal implicit loyalty of the armed forces is in 
doubt.248 In this case, Mexico is no different from other Latin American countries. 
Although the official argument of the Mexican political machine is correct to some extent 
in that the military is non-threatening because there have not been any recent military 
coups, certain governmental actions send a different message. For example, Enrique 
Rojo, at the Mexican Embassy in Washington declared that since the military stood 
peacefully-by as the defender of the nation during the 2000 elections, it distinguished 
itself as being loyal to the democratic process.249 Nevertheless, the new Fox 
administration, like “all” those before it, felt it necessary to seek the support of the 
military command by co-opting active duty generals with cabinet positions or other 
political appointments. In light of the new transition to democracy, does Fox feel the need 
to ‘earn’ the support of the military?  
The Fox administration is well aware of the history of the Caudillos and 
repression at the hands of military leaders in Mexico’s history, and the recent legacy of 
high military prerogatives. Fear of the military apparatus might explain why there have 
been irregularities in the lack of government response to human rights violations and 
other atrocities at the hands of the military, and military-CISEN activities as recently 
discovered. Many officials hope Fox will not allow public access of CISEN documents 
for fear of opening a ‘Pandora’s box.’ Meanwhile, people in Mexico still demand justice 
for the massacring of over 500 students in 1968 in Mexico City by the military because 
the government has not taken appropriate action against their leaders. Overall, members 
of the military and their commanders have not been prosecuted for human rights 
violations throughout the many years of involvement in domestic affairs. In one recent 
example alone, between January and August of this year, 79 civilian complaints had 
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already been filed against the military without resolve for human rights violations during 
counter drug operations.250  
Fear of prosecution for atrocities is exactly what the military fears as a result of 
Mexico’s recent transition to democracy. That fear puts the Mexican military into the 
same situation as the militaries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others discussed in 
Chapter II. Furthermore, it is precisely a perceived threat to the military’s prerogatives 
Fox is attempting to avoid by not taking action on now unclassified CISEN documents 
and military atrocities, for fear of contestation of authority. He is further fully aware that 
his current situation with the military is very complex and does not want to push the issue 
of control. His caution in this matter can be understood but only to a limited extent. 
Mexico’s militarization in recent years is measured by its presence in key areas, its 
decentralization of command and control, and its expansion of its roles and missions in 
society are prerogatives to which the military has already grown to accept. If the military 
were to feel threatened and contested authority or took control of the country, the 
military’s success would be assured because of the extent of the country’s militarization. 
Considering the military’s extent of civic-action missions in which they are actively 
winning the hearts and minds of indigenous populations in many parts of Mexico, support 
for a military takeover by certain populations is possible. 
 Finally, the counterargument that a lack of military contestation in Mexico is 
proof of a peaceful military is inadequate and undermines the fact that the military’s 
autonomy through prerogatives is what keeps them loyal. So long as they continue to 
exercise control of their prerogatives, they will not contest authority. However, what 
must be understood about the history of Latin America militaries is that many of the 
military coups occur not by generals in the high commands, but by colonels who are bold 
and have the motivation and support to contest. In 1996, the military successfully 
imprisoned General Gallardo only because he peacefully suggested a change of behavior 
for the military through an ombudsman. However, what would have happened had he 
gained support from among loyal troops first, and taken the presidency by force? 
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 This question is at the root of the concern for two basic issues for Mexico and its 
military today. The lack of democratic controls over the military, and the “void” of 
control that remained when the PRI lost control of the country, has left the military 
standing as a hindrance in Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. 
F.  CONCLUSION  
 Mexico’s transition to democracy has not changed the problematic trends that 
started gaining momentum in the two previous administrations. The militarization trend 
of Mexico in response to insurgency and illegal drugs had already been well established 
at the height of the now defunct authoritarian regime. However, democratization has only 
increased the severity posed by the insurgency and terrorist movements, requiring an 
additional commitment of military forces to deal with such threats while gaining more 
prerogatives. The escalation of the military’s response is giving them a seat at the 
negotiating table as Mexico struggles to consolidate democracy. The transition is further 
allowing members of the legislature to finally experiment with the caliber of their 
constitutional powers. However, both the president and members of Congress should be 
cautious in their approach at attempting to subordinate the military under civilian control, 
in light of their tremendous autonomy and influence in society. 
 When will the military’s role expansion end, and what should be done to establish 
democratic controls over the Mexican military? In the final chapter, this author attempts 
to summarize the highlights of this research, the topic of which has only been addressed 
by very few authors. The conclusion is followed by a policy prescription, in which 
recommendations are made to President Fox on how to bring about Democratic controls 
over the military. Finally, a recommendation is made to the U.S. Government on how to 
improve U.S.-Mexican relations at a time that is ripe for amends for a history of bad 



















VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSION 
Mexico’s transition to democracy in July 2000, considered an accomplishment 
against all odds according to many analysts, has caused a re-evaluation of Mexican 
politics. Prior to 2000, analysis normally revolved around debates over how to label its 
authoritarian form of government, and whether necessary conditions existed in Mexico to 
make a transition to democracy. The literature on Mexico abounds with books about its 
authoritarian and regime-related subjects, but very little has been written about its 
military, much less an in-depth analysis of the military’s impact on society. In light of the 
new transition, high military prerogatives coupled with the lack of democratic controls, 
and the void of control left by the PRI make it likely that, the Mexican military will be a 
hindrance to the consolidation of democracy.  
The unique relationship that emerged between the military and the PRI allowed 
the PRI to dominate Mexican politics for 71 year. Both grew dependent on each other for 
survival, one to remain in power, and the other to remain autonomous and for the right to 
exercise political influence. So loyal were these participants to each other that they went 
to great lengths to maintain their powers, including political espionage against opposition 
leaders, kidnappings, murder, and other types of pressure. These tactics in the hands of 
the military, including their involvement with CISEN recently, were responsible for the 
human rights violations in Mexico. 
With a reward and punishment reinforcement mechanism, the PRI was able to 
exert its power over members of Congress and political opponents, but also to command 
the military’s loyalty. Evidence suggests that the shifting of generals and their troops was 
a common measure of control over the military to prevent it from supporting or being too 
lenient with PRI opponents. As long as the PRI employed these measures of control over 
the military, there was no need for democratic controls over the military because 
manipulation sufficed. 
After the PRI lost its power in July 2000, it left a void of control over the military 
since there are no alternative democratic controls in place to allow oversight of the armed 
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forces. The executive’s assignment of political appointments to active duty generals in 
reward for their loyalty was the practice in Mexico during the last regime, and as I have 
shown, on the new one as well. Having a history of the military being manipulated for 
political ends against its society, Mexico’s democracy cannot afford to have the 
‘guardians’ guarding themselves. Their level of autonomy and penetration of society, 
especially when the PRI no longer controls them, is a volatile mixture. 
Although other factors can also hinder Mexico’s consolidation of democracy 
when joined, the lack of democratic controls over the military could be sufficient to 
prevent a successful outcome. However, in selecting the best course of action, Fox will 
have to adopt a realist approach at prioritizing his plan for democratization. Other issues 
could quickly become un-important if the executive cannot limit and control the 
military’s actions. On the other hand, if the military is bound with democratic controls 
and lead by layers of ranking civilians, other necessary factors for consolidation can then 
be executed without fear of a military contestation. Unless Mexico establishes democratic 
controls over the military, the armed forces will continue to be “the last bunker” yet to be 
taken in achieving democracy in Mexico.251 
 B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As in any other country just transitioning to democracy, Mexico has to address or 
solve some of the problems in the following five arenas outlined by Linz and Stepan: 
Civil Society, Political Society, Rule of Law, State Apparatus, and Economic Society.252 
In finding a prescription for any nation, however, it must be understood that no nation is 
the same before or after its transition to democracy, but all countries have to establish 
controls over the military if democracy is to be consolidated.  
1.  Recommendations for President Fox and the Mexican Congress 
President Fox should do everything in his power to bring about democratic 
controls of the military under civilian direction so that it will not stand as a hindrance in 
Mexico’s consolidation of democracy. The president, with support from the Congress, 
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should develop a strategy to establish civilian control without making the military feel 
threatened, although the elimination of military prerogatives is exactly what the polity 
should do. The outline provided below is a model by which the executive and the 
Congress could establish democratic controls over the military under civilian rule.   
A. Establish democratic controls: 
1. Subordinate the status and power of the current secretaries of defense, the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force by placing them under civilian leaders with 
trained civilian cadres emplaced throughout the system. It should be 
similarly arranged as those discussed in the section of the minister of 
defense in Chapter II. 
2. Replace cabinet positions held by generals with civilians, and eliminate all 
the other prerogatives previously discussed. 
3. The president and his civilian staff, along with advisors from the military 
should: conduct an assessment of the country’s strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats, and from that, develop a security plan.  
4. The president and his civilian staff should further modify the military’s 
roles and missions to support the presidential plan and, followed by 
establishing appropriate philosophy, training, and equipment. The plan 
should count on civilian organizations to carry out the bulk of the plan and 
only be assisted by the military as a last resort and with appropriate 
restrictions and rules of engagements under rule of law. 
B. Modify roles and missions: 
1. The president should reduce the military’s internal role in counter drug 
operations and their assistance to police should only be extended as a 
support role. He should further rebuild the police systems with better pay, 
training, equipment and support so that they can re-legitimize their role in 
the eyes of the public. 
2. Primary efforts should be given to end the military’s role of intelligence 
collection on civilians and terminate their assignments to CISEN. 
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3. Remove the military from performing civic duties and increase support for 
those civilian organizations charged with such activities. 
4. Redirect portions of the military to peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance outside the country. 
5. Reduce the military’s strength to a more manageable size, but better 
educated, professionalized and trained. 
C. Congress should: 
1. Take charge of their existing duties and powers under the constitution to 
restrict the military, and further create laws that will hold the military 
accountable for human rights abused from now on.  
2. Create laws that include on-going oversight measures, and to promote 
legislation that supports a plan to send troops on peacekeeping missions 
around the world. 
3. Develop legislation that will eliminate the state intelligence agencies, 
create a single federal intelligence agency with training on the rule of law 
in a democracy, and their role in it. This organization should also be 
directed externally so that Mexican citizens are not the victims of their 
trade. 
2.  Recommendations for National Guard (state partnership program)  
In many ways, the National Guard of the United States is the model apparatus of 
civil-military relations in America. Unlike the active forces who respond to civilians at 
the federal level (executive and Congressional) and international issues, the civil-military 
relations of the National Guard transcends through the domestic, national, and 
international levels. On many types of occasions, the National Guard may be called to 
respond to floods in their respective states, guard airports in response to a national 
emergency, as well as fulfilling peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance to 
other countries. In all instances, members of the National Guard are exposed to civilians 
and civilian authorities. Through the State Partnership Program, the National Guard 
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interacts with other countries and their militaries in many positive ways, as in the case of 
the Texas National Guard having a partnership with the Czech Republic.  
For these reasons, the National Guard is in a unique position to serve as a role 
model to countries transitioning to democracy because of its foundation in the citizen-
soldier concept. What better way to keep the military under control than the very citizens 
who serve in it, and who themselves and their families are affected by military policies, 
thereby serving as a quality control mechanism. Through the State Partnership Program 
and others, the U.S. can open key channels of communication and cooperation at many 
levels with Mexico. “Why Mexico?” 
Perhaps in no other time in history, has the U.S. had the unique opportunity to 
open channels of communication with Mexico because of the existing similarities and 
compatibilities between the two nations. Of particular significance, President Bush and 
President Fox have enjoyed a friendship since the times they were both governors, further 
sharing similar experiences and having a connection to individual citizens of their states. 
The sharing of a 2,000-mile border and a partnership in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) has created an economic bond between both countries. 
Not only is the time ripe to establish other relations with Mexico, but also the 
state of Texas and its National Guard could be the driving force behind these efforts 
because of common issues. The different types of commonalities between both countries 
should increase the success of creating a bridge of friendship. The increase in the 
Hispanic population of Mexican decent in the U.S. has established a unity of common 
cultures between the two republics, and Texas has some of the highest numbers. 
Furthermore, and although an issue of contention in the past, Texas shares a 
history with Mexico like no other American state such as in the Battle of the Alamo, 
annexation of land, and other border disputes. However, at a time when depending on thy 
neighbor for increased security is critical, the time to make history right again is 
complete. The logic of attempting to establish relations must not be misunderstood as 
being one of convenience for the U.S., but rather, more of an opportunity for both 
countries to create a new history together.  
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It is for these important facts that the Texas National Guard could be the vehicle 
by which to initiate dialog and subsequently enhance communications between military-
to-military (mil-to-mil), military-to-government (mil-to-gov), and government-to-
government (gov-to-gov) on a routine basis. Particularly among units in the National 
Guard along the Texas Border, many soldiers speak Spanish and themselves share part of 
the Mexican culture, thereby heightening the understanding of sensitivities important in 
international relations. 
The U.S. and Mexican governments find themselves at a time when they can both 
make historic gains by making amends for any failed histories resulting in friction, while 
also exploiting the opportunity to build on successful ones. Let our nations dare to be 
different from previous administrations by embracing the opportunity before us and make 
history right again.  
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